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U.S. policy towards India and Pakistan requires a paradigm shift to give the region a vibrant future through economic strength, openness, knowledge and democracy.
The United States of America, whether anyone likes it or not, is at this point in time, the world's only truly global power. Although the short lived unilateralism brought about by the demise of the Soviet Union is already on its way out and there are numerous predictions of its demise (and the concurrent rise of other countries or entities like China and the European Union), such a cataclysmic event or epoch defining moment in history is still far away - ‘how far' being anyone's guess. Naturally, one can assume that the Americans are also aware of the theory of historical rises and falls and would certainly be doing all they can to postpone their downfall.
Notwithstanding the important role that the U.S.A. would continue playing globally and regionally, in keeping with the theme of this special issue, this article is primarily concerned with America's role in South Asia generally and more specifically in conflict resolution / CBMs between India and Pakistan. As Maldives and Bhutan remain peripheral and even Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal are relatively minor players in the U.S. worldview, this article will focus on the bigger two of South Asia's eight countries. Interestingly, the last two letters making the U.S.A.'s acronym are also the standard contraction for South Asia.
The role of all global empires has been a paradoxical one. While on the one hand their historical conquests have created instability in the wake of tumbling rulers and marching armies - which have not been too different from the forces that the U.S.A. has now deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan - these powers are also concerned with the task of maintaining regional security and stability, if for no other reason than to, at least, create an environment that suits their long term strategies.
The U.S.A.'s role in South Asia is not too different. As the chief global power the U.S. would like to be the stabilizing force (read, power broker) in this volatile region, wherein reside some 1.5 billion people making just under a quarter of the globe's population. As with every other projection of national power across international boundaries, this too is for the U.S.A.'s own national interests: Long term ally Pakistan has been unstable for most of the past 30 odd years since the erstwhile Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In the period following the Soviet withdrawal, the jihadist forces created by U.S. and Pakistan came to bedevil both these countries. 9-11 notwithstanding, Pakistan has suffered much more in terms of internal violence and instability than the U.S.; the jihadist and militant forces released have proven to be the proverbial genie that could not be bottled back.
With U.S. patronage removed, Pakistani strategists who had long perceived their country to be in a perpetual conflict with India saw the opportunity of using these low cost "non state actors" to serve as strategic assets in their bid to balance the odds. Thus Pakistan began to develop its strategic depth into Afghanistan through Taliban allies and also used these elements with a view to tip the long frozen stalemate in Kashmir in what came to be known as the Kargil War. This use of armed partisans by a nation state as a policy is perhaps unique in the post WW II period. As two recent reports, both very uncharitable and damaging to Pakistan - and hence strongly contested by her - one by the London School of Economics and the other by the Rand Corporation (seen as an extension of the U.S. establishment), indicate the U.S./West does not believe that Pakistan has fully jettisoned these forces and truly ended their asymmetric use for shoring up its security, howsoever it may protest its innocence. It would appear that Pakistani establishment's psychological makeup brought about by its conflict with India justifies war by all means available. The U.S. does not accept this logic or really appreciate Pakistan's appetite for an unwinnable standoff with a rising power - a struggle it can hardly afford in view of the over 100 billion dollar national debt and general fragility brought about by numerous fault lines; indeed, a U.S. journalist has called the country "a Yugoslavia with nuclear weapons." As the U.S. needs the Pakistani establishment's unfailing support in its own fledgling war in Afghanistan, it is willing to support it with stabilizing financial shots in the arm - both bilateral and multilateral - for the time being.
With the historical and almost proverbial instability that this region has witnessed ever since the Partition and the inability of the two regional powers, India and Pakistan, to resolve their issues bilaterally, the region's need for one or more external stabilizers has always existed. Indeed, since 1998, the fact that four or the world's eight nuclear powers straddle this region has made the U.S.A's role as a global stabilizer even more important. With India and Pakistan locked into mutual antagonism and intransigence that find no parallel other than the one between Israel and the hard-line Islamists of Hamas and Hizbollah, the U.S.'s role is not an easy one. However, whatever long term preference that the U.S. may show for India, such an act would be logical given not only India's much great power potential and global outreach of its businesses but also the fact that the Indian Diaspora (NRIs or Non-Resident Indians in official Indian parlance) in the U.S. is now pulling considerable weight. This weight is evident not only in the political caucus but also in academic, business and now in government also. The head of USAID as well as the U.S. special representative for the Muslim World are both Indians.
Just one example of the manner in which the U.S. differentiates between her relationship with the two nuclear armed neighbors is the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal - officially called United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act - signed on October 10, 2008. While Pakistan has constantly cried hoarse on this issue, the U.S. has clearly indicated its tilt towards the larger of the South Asian antagonists. On the other hand, with Pakistan, the U.S. attitude is a mixed one: while officially the U.S. continues to place its trust in Pakistan's nuclear command and control systems (at least in the post-A.Q. Khan period), it is almost certain that certain U.S. and other interest groups work through their congressional caucuses and rather gullible or even pliable media to malign Pakistan's nuclear program as one being susceptible to terrorist takeovers. Only recently the U.S. has even pressurized China into not fully supporting Pakistan's civilian nuclear activities by way of officially questioning its membership the financially rewarding (civilian) Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The U.S. role with regard to Pakistan has been as topsy-turvy as Alice's foray into the wonderland. Pakistan went from being the "most allied (non-NATO) ally" at one time and one that was given a formal "democracy waiver" to a country that was sanctioned by various restrictions and to finally a leading ally in the global War on Terror (WOT) that was launched in the wake of the 9-11 attacks. Today the country is the recipient of one of the largest U.S. shares of U.S. benevolence - both military and civil. Although this assistance is primarily a mechanism to maintain Pakistan Army's continued cooperation in the WOT until some sort of stability returns to the region, the U.S. is also concerned about its faltering image in the Muslim world generally and Pakistan specifically: the fall 2009 IRI survey measuring public support for U.S. in Pakistan to be a mere two percent of the population (International Republican Institute, Pakistan Public Opinion Survey, Oct. 2009). This poll led to a new policy of the U.S. government engaging directly with the people of Pakistan that was manifested in Secretary Clinton meeting with and addressing Pakistani civil society directly during her last visit here.
Indeed, Pakistan's lumping together with its extremely unstable neighbor in the much-criticized Af-Pak policy includes the appointment of a Special Representative of President Obama, Mr. Holbrooke who is perhaps the single most frequent visitor to Pakistan. It is primarily this lumping together of the region into one strategic policy entity that continues to provide convergence of Pak-U.S. interests and relevance to the Pakistani establishment in U.S. strategic view. Given the generally poor state of achievements and future prospects of the Extra Regional Forces (ERF) in Afghanistan, especially after the recent change of command, an early U.S. pullout seem very remote. America needs to be in Afghanistan for the long haul - and as a corollary it needs to stabilize Pakistan at least to the extent that its interests require it to provide a supply route and bulwark against the Taliban activities in FATA.
Notwithstanding the multi-billion dollar annual bill for aid to Pakistan financed by the U.S. taxpayers, the American relationship with Pakistan still remains a tactical one and not a strategic one - in spite of repeated U.S. statements to the contrary. Pakistan does not hold the kind of long term promise that the much more stable and eight times bigger India does. India's new billionaires are eating up Western legends like Jaguar and Range Rover not to speak of the Mittal steel empire; its IT industry is now the world's back office and worth more than Pakistan's total exports. For any choice business relationship, the more powerful of two or more companies would always be the natural choice. As any mariner knows the greater the weight of the anchor, the greater the staying power. Furthermore, the trust deficit indicated by negative reports on Pakistani intelligence operations and constant mention of their linkages with the Haqqani network means that Pakistan is more a partner of necessity than choice.
In spite of more than 20 years of protracted violence in Indian administered Kashmir's right for self-determination, which has seen the infliction of severe human rights abuses by more than half a million armed soldiers, the international community is nowhere close to recognizing Pakistan's principled stand on this 62- year old dispute; the UN Security Council resolutions that Pakistan often quotes in its case are non-binding Chapter VII resolutions. At least for the time being God and luck are with the larger of the two militaries/ countries. The U.S. mediated quietening of Pakistan's historically hot Eastern frontier can only be counted upon until the Afghan imbroglio lasts, long as it may be. It is the Afghan situation which is the primary driver of Pakistan's current relevance to the U.S.
Although officially the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is on record as having said "We've encouraged both Pakistan and India to resume dialogue and to talk about everything, including Kashmir, because now the security of both countries is threatened by the forces of extremism," in practical terms this is simply a tactic to allay Pakistan's permanent fear and visceral belief that an international conspiracy led by India is behind all its troubles and instability. By stating that "It is not in India's interest for Pakistan to be destabilised (and)... it is not in Pakistan's interest for Afghanistan to be destabilised" the U.S. has been merely propping up its people in Islamabad and Kabul.
Speaking to Pakistani scholar Hasan Abbas who holds the Quaid-i-Azam Chair at the Columbia University in December 2009, Ms. Clinton had proposed forming an international group to help Pakistan and India resolve their differences. However, she had qualified that the impetus to do so must come from the two countries. Indeed, this is perhaps the key to stability in South Asia, as any internationalization is out of the question for India.
Speaking at a seminar on the start of U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue in early June 2010, the No. 2 U.S. foreign policy figure, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Burns, hinted about the shape of things to come. Not only did he state that the U.S. was not against India's inclusion in the UN Security Council as a permanent member but clearly stated that the U.S.A.'s strong ties with Pakistan cannot be at the expense of India.
No article can be complete without at least touching Pakistan's role in the WOT. As the battles against militant (Taleban - both Afghan and Pakistani) rage constantly on the Pak-Afghan border which has been stated to be the most dangerous place on earth by Newsweek magazine, the issue of U.S. drones and collateral damage is a major policy controversy in Pakistan. While these strikes have taken out some leading Al-Qaeda operatives, the public and political backlash against the U.S. and the Pakistani government continues to add to instability. The instable Pakistani government also walks a tight rope on the issue of the badly needed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. In his most recent visit to Pakistan Mr. Holbrooke warned Pakistan of it facing U.S. sanctions if it went ahead with the project that has been held up for over a decade.
Bangladesh
Being a rather homogenous nation, Bangladesh does not suffer from the ethno-linguistic fault lines of Pakistan or political problems of India. However, the country does suffer instability form economic causes. Hence the U.S. role in its affairs is rather limited.
While the tight U.S. balancing act between India and Pakistan may be quite apparent, the relationship between India and China in which the U.S. makes the third partner in the proverbial triangle is not clearly visible. Although the India-China mutual trade being in excess of $ 50 billion annually - and which makes China the largest single partner for India - may seem to making these two most populous neighboring countries in the world good friends, this is not a completely sweet relationship. China not only occupies a significant area claimed by India in the Aksai Chin area of Kashmir but has also been gifted parts of Pakistani-administered Kashmir (as part of their border agreement) to which India objects. India also has several cases against China in the WTO. As the two continue to rise, one certainly more phenomenally than the other, competition of kinds other than economic is quite a natural outcome. Much that China is very keen to keep this relationship a benign - if not actively friendly - yet the interest of the U.S.A does not lie in the strengthening of these ties.
A massive cooperative relationship of 2.5 billion people is not likely to weigh lightly with the strategic planners in the U.S.A. who would like to keep these powers divided if not actively at loggerheads. At worst, for the U.S.A., this would naturally mean befriending one strongly and keeping the other in a somewhat ambiguous relationship. Strategic ambiguity is also a time tested tool of statecraft. Ancient and much maligned as it may be, ‘divide and rule' has not lost its utility as stabilizing technique.
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka is now on a new found path towards stability after nearly three decades of a very destructive and bloody civil war. Throughout this testing period, there was no direct role of the U.S.A. Which was, all the same, keen to have the ethnic issue settled politically - again because they wanted the stability in the region and also to send the message that in the post- 9-11 period there would be no distinction between nationalist struggles and terrorism or insurgencies. According to a senior Sri Lankan military officer speaking on the condition of anonymity the U.S.A.'s Sri Lanka policy has always worked in close conjunction with that of India. China has also been part of the Lankan scene: it is building a new commercial port at Hambantota, about 180 kilometres south of Colombo. In the past also china has helped build a lot of infrastructure projects like roads and irrigation project. For the present, the U.S. is not concerned about this aspect of China's interest in the region as it has an extensive presence in the IOR. This is primarily orchestrated through Diego Garcia. However, if it feels threatened, the U.S. would leverage India and use her against Chinese interests. As for the country itself as long as it keeps on going with the resettlement and rehabilitation of the Tamils no instability is foreseen as all the main political parties are in favor of a political settlement.
Nepal
This small and poor nation has seen a fair degree of instability over the past decade which saw the end of a centuries old monarchy primarily through the rise of a leftist Maoist movement whose contribution to the rise of the republic was vital. Also vital is Nepal's geography as a barrier between India and China. The U.S. would like to see stability return here with a much lesser Maoist role. That is its primary interest as it has always feared a certain ambiguous relationship between such movements and China.
To conclude, it can be said that the U.S.A.'s role in South Asia over the next five years would be closely linked with its Afghan War strategy. This would require stabilizing Pakistan to an extent that this prevents any implosion of this fragile state. It is unlikely that the U.S. would be able to make any headway in leading Pakistan to a table where it is able to make some sort of permanent peace with India by finally accepting that the age of redrawing borders is over i.e. accepting the LOC as the international boundary. She would also have to recognize that Kashmir is a Kashmiri and not a Pakistani problem. If and when the Kashmiri people are able to force India to make a deal - with or without Pakistan - that would be the beginning of peace and security in South Asia.
What the U.S. could do to facilitate the process of stabilizing South Asia is to work on removing Pakistan's self-destructive preoccupation with India by impressing upon it that the age of global geo-strategic supremacy has passed and that principled standpoints have little or no validity in the real world. Indeed, grand political and military strategies have now been replaced by economic and governance realities which alone will dictate the future of nations. If Pakistan does not have money to feed its large population or provide them with energy, water and human development requirements, its quest for security through military power and covert means alone shall forever remain an illusion. Security means the absence of fear - fear not just of enemies across the border but the real fears of going to bed hungry, not having medicine when sickness strikes, and being permanently devoid of resources, and without legal and social protection. As the nations of Europe and Japan learned after wars and totalitarianism, a vibrant future lies in economic strength in the age of openness, knowledge, and democracy. Pakistan, India and the US policy planners towards this region all desperately need a paradigm shift. 
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