 In summer 2008, as Beijing basked in the glory of an Olympics well hosted, the international community had to concede that China's quest for soft power had hit a milestone. By organizing and executing the largest global event - and that too with panache - Beijing had shown its capacity for interacting with, appealing to, and influencing other countries through non-military means. This soft power success was not, however, an accident of the Olympics - it was the crowning moment in a foreign policy initiative long pursued by the Chinese government.
In October 2007, while addressing the National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Hu Jintao argued that China must "enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests." Although the phrase only entered China's vocabulary a year before the Olympics, Beijing's drive for soft power is now over a decade old.
Since the late 1990s, China's foreign policy has dabbled beyond the security realm. Indeed, Beijing increasingly emphasizes investing in infrastructure and other developmental aid, promoting Chinese culture and companies, mitigating concerns about China's economic rise, and supporting multinational organizations.
The reasons for this are manifold. Primarily, Beijing wants to further boost China's economy by attracting new trade partners, enticing foreign companies to consolidate their presence in the Chinese market, and facilitating trade by maintaining peace around its periphery. By winning over the international community in economic and cultural arenas, Beijing is also looking to isolate Taiwan. Moreover, China seeks more cooperation with the United States, on Beijing, rather than Washington's terms.
In its desire to match the U.S. in terms of global influence, China has articulated its soft power policies as a direct response to those of Washington. While American soft power focuses on culture - Hollywood movies and television shows, democratic ideals, and the promotion of good governance - China exerts its soft power in tangible ways. Especially within the developing world, Beijing has prioritized trade and energy deals, and has built roads, hospitals, and schools.
This difference can be attributed to the fact that Chinese soft power has waxed as American influence has waned. Since 2001, the U.S. has focused on counterterrorism as its global agenda. This has led to Washington being accused of disrespecting national sovereignty from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the other hand, China, with its 'win-win' philosophy, has emerged as a respectful power that privileges investment over ideology.
This is not to say that culture plays no part in China's ascending global influence. In 2000, Gao Xingjian won China's first Nobel Prize for literature, and "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon," directed by Ang Lee, remains the highest-grossing, foreign-language film in U.S. history. In 2005, China's education ministry announced a new initiative to promote Chinese-language teaching in American colleges and language institutes across the globe. Between 2004 and 2009, the ministry established 282 Confucius Institutes - Chinese culture and language centers - in 88 countries. The government's current goal is to establish one thousand such institutes by 2020.
Chinese universities, in an effort to create an international campus culture, are also encouraging the enrollment of foreign students. Over the past decade, the number of international students has tripled from 36,000 to 110,000, and stricter student visa requirements for the U.S. and UK are expected to bolster this trend. In January this year it was reported that Chinese students were beginning to fake foreign passports so that they could secure a spot at some of the mainland's best universities - a desperate measure that is nonetheless testament to Beijing's commitment to soft power in the educational arena.
That said, China's most significant soft power initiatives have focused on trade, investment, and infrastructure development - exactly the kind of engagement the developing world has sought from Washington, but failed to receive. It helps that the Chinese have a reputation for completing infrastructure projects on time and, more importantly, on budget.
In 2004, President Hu toured Latin America, calling for deeper economic, trade, and technology ties. Beijing has since invested more than $50 billion in the region, and 400 trade and investment deals have made China a significant economic player there.
In Africa, too, China exerted its soft power as part of an effort to secure cheap energy and establish a greater presence for Chinese companies. Beijing forgave more than $1 billion in debt from African countries, dispatched doctors to work across the continent, and encouraged the enrollment of over 100,000 Africans in Chinese universities and military institutes.
Lately, China has used its soft power to make inroads into South Asia. In 2009, trade between India and China exceeded $50 billion annually. And despite the ongoing Arunachal Pradesh border dispute, India and China have come together on issues they agree upon: securing affordable energy supplies, negotiating equitable standards for a climate change agreement, returning to the Doha trade talks, and altering the structures of multilateral organizations.
Pakistan, too, which has historically had a strong military relationship with China, has enjoyed the benefits of Beijing's soft power initiatives. In recent years, Chinese companies have made targeted investments in the Pakistani telecommunications, banking, and power sectors, and since 2006, China has been Pakistan's largest trading partner (having surpassed the U.S. in this role). Chinese investment in infrastructure also continues apace - the development of the strategically important Gwadar Port has been followed by agreements in 2009 by the Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute to build the nuclear power plants Chashma III and IV.
The most influential aspect of China's soft power drive has been its participation in a variety of multilateral organizations. For instance, last year, about 2,200 Chinese served as United Nations peacekeepers. Rather than provide combat troops, China has dispatched engineers, medical teams, and military observers to boost its image as a peaceful, responsible country.
China has also played an integral role in six-party nuclear disarmament talks aimed at discouraging North Korean proliferation. Since North Korea abandoned the talks last year, Chinese state-run banks and companies are planning to invest $10 billion to build railroads, harbors, and houses in North Korea. This investment has been perceived as a dangling carrot to draw Pyongyang back to the talks. Additionally, China continues to participate in the World Trade Organization, has worked towards the UN Millennium Development Goals, climate change agreements, and even participated in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
 That said, China's charm offensive still has a long way to go before the international community is completely seduced. In the political context, China's poor track record of human rights abuses, corruption, inequality, and undemocratic practices cannot be easily overlooked. The cracks were visible even during the 2008 Olympics - protest demonstrations were clamped down upon; journalists and tourists alike complained about restricted internet access; many criticized the state sport system for mass-producing gold medalists. This year, the Chinese government's showdown with Google, the internet giant, also served as a reminder that Beijing's political outlook is authoritarian, anti-youth, and dependent on a communist worldview.
Interestingly, China's handling of Google's announcement that it may stop complying with Chinese censorship rules and shut down operations revealed the extent to which Beijing's soft power policy has influenced domestic politics. Rather than play politics, the Chinese government opted to deal with Google on a commercial level and suggested that the search engine was taking on the authorities because it was having business troubles. The fact that the Chinese government did not block Google is also telling - after all, Beijing is not known for making decisions that comply with international public opinion.
Perhaps, in a strange twist, in an effort to influence the international community through soft power initiatives, the Chinese government will end up making internal policy decisions that truly bolster its own people's "basic cultural rights and interests." 
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