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As a predominant state in South Asia in terms of land, population and the potential to evolve into a world power, India has always viewed the region, especially the small states, as its backyard and played the role of ‘security manager’ of the region. Sri Lanka is also significant in view of national security of India. Consequently, India constantly monitored the development in the small state in its Southern border and attempted to preserve Sri Lanka within its domain of influence. Currently, India seems to be losing its grip on Sri Lanka as China has been rapidly strengthening its presence in Sri Lanka leading to a diplomatic dilemma for the regional super power.
Sri Lanka’s relations with China in recent times have been cordial and especially since President Mahinda Rajapaksa assumed office as the Executive President, there has been a resurgence in China-Sri Lanka ties. The end of the war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009 seems to have bestowed the Sri Lankan state the ability to accommodate Chinese interests in the country without worrying too much about Indian sentiments. China not only aided the Sri Lankan armed forces by supplying necessary military hardware such as Jian -7 fighter jets, anti-aircraft guns, ammunitions, and surveillance radars, but also defended the island state in the international arena on charges of human rights violations during the last phase of the civil war.
Of particular significance are the ever-growing Chinese investments in Sri Lanka and its involvement in mega development projects. For instance, China is assisting Sri Lanka with the construction of, among other projects, a massive port in Hambantota, an international airport in the same region, a coal power project in Norochcholai, and the Colombo-Katunayake expressway. In sum, almost all major construction projects in Sri Lanka are currently undertaken by China which is now also the major donor country to Sri Lanka, having offered U.S.$ 1.2 billion in 2009 in grants, loans and credit facilities.
Summing up the current Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka, Frida Ghitis maintained that the “level of cooperation (between China and Sri Lanka) is increasing by the day.” China’s interest in Sri Lanka is three-fold: friendly relations with Sri Lanka help secure the very important Indian Ocean sea lane; Sri Lanka offers an attractive market, and the port facility in Hambantota is of strategic significance as it forms part of what is popularly called the “string of pearls” strategy of China.
What is significant is that the increasing presence of China in Sri Lanka denies India the status of security manager and weakens its influence over the Island nation. There was a time when India’s predominance and hegemony over Sri Lanka was covertly accepted by the major international actors. This was exactly why when India violated the Sri Lankan air space by dropping food on the Jaffna peninsula in 1987, nobody came to the defense of Sri Lanka. China, by virtue of its intensified presence in Sri Lanka is challenging the Indian supremacy in the region. Commentators also believe that the current largely civilian nature of China-Sri Lanka relations could turn into a military alliance between the two states and especially the Hambantota Port could, if necessary, be transformed into a naval base for the Chinese. This was obviously not to the liking of the Indian foreign and defense policy makers. The last time Sri Lanka tried to align with the West in general and the U.S. in particular against the wishes of India, it responded with measures such as assisting the Tamil militants, which culminated in the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 and the deployment of the Indian armed forces in Sri Lanka, which in turn brought the Island nation under its direct control.
This time around however, India seems to prefer diplomatic means to ensure that Sri Lanka will not be exploited by hostile powers against Indian interest. In the last few months Sri Lanka received several high ranking political and military leaders from Delhi promoting, especially defense deals. The last such visit was made by Indian Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar in December 2010, which resulted in the agreement to conduct joint naval exercise in Sri Lankan Waters and to have annual defense summits between the two states. The defense deals are seen by the Indians as a mechanism to keep Sri Lanka within India’s security schemes. India seems to have no major problems working with Sri Lanka currently because Sri Lanka has been successfully executing the balancing act between the two Asian giants.
The problem, however, is that Indian diplomacy so far has failed to arrest or slow down Chinese inroads into Sri Lanka. What is possible is that Sri Lanka could lean further towards China in the future because Sri Lankans sees China as a generous and a natural ally. India on the other hand has been perceived as dominating and demanding. For instance the Indian demands in relations to the ethnic conflict resolution are not received well within the Sinhala community. Meanwhile, China does not ask question on ethnic conflict or human rights related issues. China believes that Sri Lankans are capable of dealing with their own problems. The conventional wisdom is that the present government has a soft corner for China. This scenario certainly has created a major dilemma within the Indian policy making apparatus in terms of responding to the challenges created by the ever increasing Chinese presence in Sri Lanka. 
Dr S. I. Keethaponcalan is Chair of the Department of Conflict Analysis and Dispute Resolution, Fulton School of Liberal Arts, Salisbury University, Maryland, USA.
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