 December 16 last year saw a number of Pakistan’s well known intellectuals, politicians and anchors discussing on various television channels the events leading to the fall of East Pakistan on this day in 1971. A majority of them found fault with the handling of that province by the federal government of that time and the attitude of the military, bureaucracy and politicians of the other four provinces of Pakistan. It was generally conveyed that the people of East Pakistan were maltreated and denied their rights. Interestingly, some of the politicians and intellectuals agreed that the secession of the eastern wing could have been avoided if the National Assembly’s inaugural session had taken place in March 1971 in Dhaka, as was scheduled. What was amusing was that some of the speakers were actually present during that important phase of Pakistan’s history and were still active in their respective field. They accepted silently the threats of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto against attending the session and were indirectly a party to the decision of preventing the Assembly from being convened in Dhaka.
No politician from the Punjab, Sindh, NWFP or Balochistan defied Bhutto or raised a voice against denying the right to the Awami League to form the government at the Centre. No long marches were planned and no protest meetings held in the western wing against the undemocratic stance of the leader of the second largest party in the newly elected National Assembly and the murder of democracy by the CMLA Gen Yahya Khan’s short-sighted military action. To the contrary, according to the news stories appearing in the national newspapers on the day after the military action, Mr. Bhutto was quoted as saying that “thank God, Pakistan has been saved.” It will be very interesting if some newspaper of that period digs its archives and reproduces reports of the events and statements of politicians made during February-March 1971. That will be quite educative for everyone and particularly for those who were toddlers in the 1970’s. It will also clear a lot of misunderstanding about the stature of our political icons. It will also highlight the character of the politicians and the fact whether they were vying for a rule of democracy or merely struggling for their own benefit to get power at any cost.
Some intellectuals quoted events/incidents incorrectly giving a twist to the tale. A well-known political observer mentioned that Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, MLA Zone ‘B’, was the architect of the military action for 25th March ’71. This is not true. On the contrary Lt Gen Yaqub Khan and Admiral Ahsan, Governor East Pakistan, were the two senior officers who kept insisting till the last for a political solution instead of a military action as they could assess the situation better by being present on the scene. They were in communication with Sh. Mujib and had managed to dissuade him from preferring secession to one country - a federation of Pakistan. As a last resort, Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali Khan of HQ MLA Zone ‘B’ (East Pakistan) was sent with their recommended plan of political solution to the CMLA’s Headquarters, in Rawalpindi. The recommendation of the ‘men on the spot’ received little response from the coterie at the CMLA Headquarters. In fact an impression was being given by the officials at the Headquarters that the Governor East Pakistan and the MLA Zone ‘B’ who was also the Commander Eastern Command in East Pakistan were showing cowardice against the Awami League leadership and were afraid of taking drastic action as dictated by the Headquarters CMLA. When their voices of sanity were rejected, both the gentlemen quit the scene voluntarily. General Tikka took over as MLA Zone ‘B’ in the first week of March ’71 and Dr. Abdul Malik replaced Admiral Ahsan as Governor East Pakistan. This was a classic case of Islamabad/Rawalpindi acting without a clue of the factual position or ground realities in the eastern wing. A similar ignorance of the facts on ground was witnessed in 1970 by the poor response to the cyclone and floods’ devastation in that province. Some of the foreign countries were much faster to react than our own government in Islamabad. The distance between Dacca and Islamabad was increasing day by day.
It is hard to believe that the elite in Islamabad and the military advisers of Gen Yahya Khan could not anticipate the consequences of the military action in East Pakistan in March ’71 despite knowing well the evil designs of India’s leadership. The Army in East Pakistan had to face a situation that was the result of failure of the CMLA’s men and politicians of the rest of the provinces. The leadership had been unsuccessful in resolving the vital issue of convening the National Assembly which had a majority of Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League and they were reluctant to hand over power to the majority party. The ‘free and fair elections’ of 1970 had given an opportunity to the leadership of the eastern wing to dictate terms, for a change, that was not acceptable to Mr. Bhutto or Gen Yahya Khan. Even after the military action of March ’71 and the severe reaction of Mukti Bahini, Awami League and other regional parties, the Army had taken control of the situation by the end of May and the federal government with the cooperation of the political parties of the western wing could make concerted efforts to resolve the issues.
However, they did not and somehow still expect that things would be sorted out without further violence or any threat of war with India. The period between June and November went unutilized for resolving the crisis leaving a gilt-edged opportunity for India to enter the conflict actively by organizing and supporting the Mukti Bahini operations from November 21 when Indian forces launched attacks on various key positions along the border. War was declared when Pakistan forces started hostilities on the western front on December 3. The war was lost not by the officers and men of the Army but due to inept and poor leadership both political as well as military. It is needless to point finger at the actors responsible who were instrumental in creating a deadlock. Every Pakistani knows well who they were. India got a chance to invade East Pakistan to seal a victory, dismember Pakistan and create Bangladesh.
Books giving correct account and objective analyses of the events of 1971 in South Asia are rare. A well-researched and detailed scholarly analysis is found in the book by Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, titled “War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh” (published by Vistaar Publication, New Delhi).
While a lot of words were spoken by the learned participants of a number of talk shows it was a pity that no one remembered to say a word on the plight of the Pakistanis still languishing in Mirpur, Dhaka under sub-human conditions, looking up to the people and government of Pakistan for repatriation. The documentaries shown by the TV channels also did not project the issue concerning this segment of population of Pakistan. They are perhaps being treated as state-less citizens of the world as no one seems to be concerned about their present condition. Just as the politicians of the 1970s were satisfied with a truncated Pakistan, the present elite are happy without the liability of repatriating the Pakistanis from Bangladesh and settling them down in the cities of Pakistan. The military regimes too ignored this sensitive national issue and moved out of the scene. Wither the much trumpeted ‘two nation theory’ on the basis of which Pakistan was created? Why the segment of population that had opted to migrate to Pakistan is not welcome in the Pakistan of today? Why is it that they are totally ignored whenever the events of fall of East Pakistan are recounted? Have we forgotten our responsibility forever? 
Munir Ishrat Rahmani is a former Colonel of the Pakistan Army. He is a graduate of the Command and Staff College, Quetta and has fought during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan Wars. He was stationed in East Pakistan during the 1971 conflict and is the author of a forthcoming book on Indo-Pak military history.
|
Show/hide comments
Show/hide comment form
