The End Game


Written by Tayyab Siddiqui • Region • September 2010

7-1 There is confusion and apprehension in the minds of the Americans regarding the final course of their war in Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan has come at a tremendous cost to the American people. Members of the Congress and the Administration will have to assess whether the sacrifices of our men and women in uniform and the resources we must invest to continue these efforts are the best way to protect our national security", stated Nancy Pelosi, the U.S. House Speaker reflecting the war weariness in the U.S. and growing sense of frustration and familiar to secure U.S. objectives.

In a review of Afghan policy in December 2009, President Obama announced U.S. objectives as securing Afghan population centers so that Al Qaeda could not use the country again as a launching pad for attacks on the U.S., promoting good governance, anti-corruption and rule of law in Afghanistan.

The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan has been without any justification, political or strategic. Unlike the invasion of Iraq which President Bush maneuvered sanctions from the UNSC, through a series of lies and false intelligence reports regarding the presence of WMDs, Iraq's nuclear capabilities and its links with Al Qaeda - all patently false as subsequent reports have proved.

In case of Afghanistan the U.S. did not even make a pretense, "Operation Enduring Freedom" was launched as a justifiable response to 9/11 in terms of self defense. The UN charter is explicit that right for an armed action in self defense can only be invoked if the country is under armed attack. 9/11 was not an armed attack, nor was there any evidence that Osama was involved in the planning of 9/11 nor any Afghan was among the 19 hijackers. Simply put the U.S. war against Afghanistan is without any logic, rationale or legitimacy.

After nine years, the futility of this aggression is becoming obvious. The war is costing 14 billion U.S. dollars every month besides ever increasing U.S. casualties. President Obama after an extensive review of the Afghan war in December 2009 decided to send 30,000 additional troops in the belief that the surge in the number of troops will accelerate the range and intensity of military operations as it did in Iraq.

Sadly for him during the last eight months the strategy has not worked. Causalities are mounting but the achieving of U.S. objectives is no where in sight. Ending corruption and improving rule of law are long term objectives and can not be solved within a time line.

President Obama is now reluctantly and with caveats acknowledges that "this is a war that can not be won." It has been a huge miscalculation. The attempt to impose a military solution on a war that has already been lost just can not work. Easy and occasional victories on a battle front are no guarantee that a renewed conflict does not follow. Obama is caught in this dilemma. The U.S. concedes as ISAF troops have failed to achieve the expected results and hence scramble for an alternate or concurrent strategy for a political process to achieve a peaceful resolution of the war.

A new initiative to bring the Taliban into the Afghan political process and to reinforce the military efforts has been launched. However lack of clarity and objectivity has stymied the process. Attempts at exploratory negotiations between insurgents and the Afghan government are afoot and there are reports of contacts between Taliban Leaders and President Karzai's brother and those brokered by a group of ex-Taliban leaders living in Kabul under amnesty.

Their leader a former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdus Salam Zaef has reportedly established contacts with former Prime Minister Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani a veteran fighter. Richard Holbrooke the special envoy has however denied talks between U.S. and the Taliban. "The emphasis is on reintegration to persuade Taliban foot soldiers to lay down their arms and participate in social and development projects. The reintegration policy is the key to a successful counter insurgency campaign."

U.S. policy to Afghanistan this stage seems to be without vision or parameters. There is growing urgency to spell out an exit strategy as a human and financial costs continue to increase unabated. Another major element of uncertainty is President Obama's announcement of U.S. troops draw down beginning in July 2011 and the Kabul Conference Declaration that ISAF forces will leave Afghanistan by 2014. It has unsettled the allies and the region has to prepare for the post withdrawal scenarios.

The announcements have been greeted with considerable skepticism and put a huge question mark on the stability of the security situation. There is a serious doubt as to the capacity of the Afghanistan Government and its national security forces to fill the void and assume security responsibilities by 2014 as endorsed by the International Conference in Kabul last month. There is however wide spread doubt of the capacity of the Afghan government to take charge of the country. 7-2

Another dilemma for Obama is that after the withdrawal announcement the military engagement cannot be open ended. Nor will the U.S. pubic allow U.S. presence long enough to give the Afghans time enough to develop their institutions. While disengagement in principle is acceptable there is little effort to gauge the post withdrawal syndrome. Obama's handling of the conflict has fallen sharply in U.S. public opinion polls with only 41% of the Americans approving his performance.

The confusions and apprehension in the minds of Americans regarding the final course of this decade long war has been best captured by the New York Times in its lengthy and angry editorial - "The state of the war" on August 16. The editorial deserves the long quote: "Mr. Obama needs to do a better job right now of explaining the strategy and how he is measuring progress. Here are some of things Americans and American allies need to know. Do the president and his generals still believe that counter insurgency - securing crucial areas and building up local governments - is the best chance for driving back the Taliban's? Is it even possible? Does the Administration finally have a plan to get "him" (Karzai) to deliver? Indeed we are still not clear about the benchmarks that are being set for adequate governance."

Discussing Pakistan's role in the war, The New York Times has articulated the fears and doubts, prevalent in Congress and official circles regarding Pakistan's behavior. "The administration has said and done many of the right things to try to change Pakistan's behavior - committing to long term economic aid and constantly reminding Pakistani leaders that they are playing with fire and that extremists on both sides of the border pose a genuine threat to their own survival. It is not clear whether they are getting through. Pakistan has pushed back against the Pakistani Taliban and has allowed the Americans to fly drone strikes against Al Qaeda and other fighters along its border. It also continues to shelter and aid some of the most destructive and dangerous armed factions fighting U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan. Americans need to understand what more the Administration plans to do to end this support and draw Islamabad fully into the fight - on the right side."

Regardless of the expectations or apprehensions of the New York Times, the only course for Pakistan is to say a big No to any partnership in fighting against Afghan Taliban within Afghanistan.