 President Mahinda Rajapaksa led the nation to victory over the LTTE and was elected to a second term as President in January. It seems he is now set to call the shots in Sri Lanka for at least another seven years. The 6th election for the all powerful executive position in Sri Lanka was held on January 26, 2010. What was increasingly considered a close contest, ended in a more than comfortable victory for the incumbent president Mahinda Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa, candidate of the ruling United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) polled 1842,749 more votes than his arch challenger General (retired) Sarath Fonseka, who contested as the "common candidate" of the opposition parties under the banner New Democratic Front (NDF).
Sri Lankan presidents, according to the constitution, are elected directly by the people for a six-year term. President Jayewardene introduced the present Second Republican Constitution in 1978 during his tenure. He manipulated the constitution and most other legal instruments, for that matter, to further his own and party interests. In line with this trend he introduced the Third Amendment to the constitution, which enabled the incumbent president to schedule the upcoming election any time after completion of four years in office. The idea behind the amendment was to bestow political advantage on the serving president to conduct the election at the most opportune time, which, in his opinion would guarantee victory. Presidents Jayewardene and Chandrika Kumaratunga made use of this provision to advance elections and in fact won. For the moment, therefore, the formula seems to be working. President Rajapaksa won his first term as the Executive President of Sri Lanka on November 17, 2005. Hence the next presidential election was due in 2012. Rajapaksa's victory in 2005 was not too convincing as (1) a vast majority of the Sri Lankan Tamils did not vote due to a call from the LTTE to boycott the election, and (2) the margin was too narrow. Critics argue that had the Tamils voted, Rajapaksa would have probably lost. The president became extremely popular, especially in the South, due to the Sri Lankan state's victory over the LTTE. Previous governments followed alternative policies of war and peace, including negotiations with the LTTE, for conflict resolution. No strategy, however, helped resolve the conflict. Although, president Rajapaksa's government also initiated talks with the LTTE in early 2006 and had two rounds of peace negotiations in Geneva, the focus was on a military solution. Since the LTTE was also keen on returning to the battlefield, peace talks collapsed and war resumed. On resumption of the war the government pursued an unreserved campaign to eliminate the LTTE while mobilizing international assistance and ignoring criticism on human rights and humanitarian concerns. Rajapaksa clearly provided the leadership to this multi-pronged campaign. Since, President Rajapaksa's popularity shot up in the immediate aftermath of the end of the war in May 2009, it was speculated that an early election was on the cards. Obviously he wanted to capitalize on the war victory. When the president completed four years in office in November 2009, without wasting too much time, the unscheduled election was announced. Meanwhile, the opposition parties, especially the United National Party (UNP) was in tatters as it was treated to successive electoral defeats, including provincial and local government elections. UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe was under pressure, due to poor electoral performance, to relinquish leadership. Another defeat in the presidential election would have forced him out of politics completely. He was, therefore, not eager to contest. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the other largest opposition party, knowing very well that its candidate, if fielded, would not stand a chance, was also hesitant to contest. The JVP's main concern was the parliamentary election, which it would have to face within a few more months. It did not want to exhaust the limited resources in an unwinnable lection. Therefore, when the idea of an early election was mooted, it seemed that it would be a cake walk for the incumbent president.  It was against this backdrop that a sudden unexpected split occurred in the politico-military alliance that defeated the LTTE. The successful end of the war not only boosted the hero image of the president but also his military commander, General Sarath Fonseka. He was also becoming powerful, igniting the notion that Sri Lanka was at the threshold of a military coup, which of course made the political leadership nervous. Within two months he was removed from the military command and in the name of a promotion, was made Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a ceremonial position sans any real power. The political leadership felt safe but the new CDS started to complain. Sensing the clear schism between the ruling regime and the former commander, the opposition parties started to promote the quarrel. The media, which was deprived of exciting stories in the post-war scenario, also pitched in by running headlines about the split and eventually leading to a total breakdown of the alliance. Fonseka was made the common candidate of the opposition parties.
A race, which was hitherto considered by the government as a walkover, turned into a tough and nasty contest with the entry of Fonseka as candidate. While the opposition focused on the issues of authoritarianism, corruption and nepotism, the government targeted the procurement deals handled by Fonseka or his family members when he was the army chief, in a way that it turned the tables on him through corruption charges. Fonseka promised to abolish the executive presidency and implement the 17th Amendment to the constitution, as a part of his democratization program. He did seem to be making headway. One of the gains he made was the endorsement of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the major Tamil party, which supported the LTTE during the war. The government called him a traitor, based on the claim that there was a secret pact between Fonseka and the TNA to divide the country. In one of the propaganda meetings the President vowed to abrogate the secret pact on January 27th. The other major weapon the government used against Fonseka was the fear of military authoritarianism. The general will take the country to military dictatorship, the government argued. Interestingly, the state television stations repeatedly broadcast movies like Hitler and Idi Ameen. The state media was accused of violating the election laws by overdoing the campaign for the president. Although the campaign was marred by election-related violence, the day of voting was peaceful. Mahinda Rajapaksa won convincingly with an unchallengeable margin. The opposition parties, however, rejected the results claiming that the polls were rigged electronically. The government on the other hand announced that Fonseka was planning to assassinate the president and stage a military coup. So, continues the politics of acrimony. The result of the presidential election has not settled the issues completely. Parliament was dissolved a few days after the arrest of Gen. Sarath Fonseka on charges of planning a coup against Rajapaksa. A fresh election is also scheduled soon as the term of the current council expires in April this year. The parties will take the battle to the next phase. It is extremely unlikely that there will be any major division within the ruling alliance as it presents a winning combination. For the opposition, however, it will not be easy, first to present a unified front, and second to win the election. Even if they win, the president can dissolve Parliament again after one year of its election. Therefore, the position and prospect of the opposition seems hopeless. If one goes by the conduct of the presidential election and the results, there can be little doubt about the government's victory in the upcoming parliamentary election. Yet, regardless of the parliamentary election results, President Rajapaksa will determine the national agenda at least for another seven years. 
Dr S. I. Keethaponcalan is Chair of the Department of Conflict Analysis and Dispute Resolution, Fulton School of Liberal Arts, Salisbury University, Maryland, USA.
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