A Bridge Too Far

There cannot be a world totally free of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future but what is possible is a drastic reduction in nuclear arsenals.When US President Barack Obama chaired a special meeting of the UN Security Council on September 24 and called upon those states which have not signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) to join as non-nuclear weapon states, the Indian reaction was swift and strong: New Delhi will not sign the NPT because it regards the treaty as "discriminatory" and holds the Permanent Five (P-5) countries responsible for not doing anything substantial for general and complete disarmament.

As the debate on NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is gaining momentum following the speech of Barack Obama on April 5, 2009 in Prague in which he had called that "nations with nuclear weapons have the responsibility to move towards disarmament and those without have the responsibility to forsake them", the Indian reaction to Washington's new drive to launch a new initiative for nuclear disarmament and CTBT has been predictable. What is NPT and CTBT and how the two treaties are viewed by India? If the U.S Senate ratifies CTBT and the Obama administration seriously strives for a drastic cut of nuclear weapons, will India give second thoughts to its age-old stance on the two treaties?

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty was signed in 1968 which prohibits manufacture or transfer of nuclear weapons, but allows peaceful use of nuclear energy under the rules of strict monitoring. The 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council i.e. United States, Russia, UK, China and France are recognized as nuclear weapon powers while others cannot develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Countries like India, Israel and Pakistan, which have acquired nuclear weapons but have not signed the NPT, are required to destroy their nuclear arsenal once they sign the NPT.

North Korea, which has obtained nuclear weapons capability was a signatory of NPT but withdrew from it in 2003 whereas Iran is a signatory but is believed to be pursuing its nuclear weapons program. So far, 189 countries have signed the NPT. The CTBT was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996 and so far 150 countries have ratified it, whereas, 32 countries have signed but not ratified it, including the United States. China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran and Israel have signed the CTBT but have not ratified it, whereas, India, Pakistan and North Korea have not signed the treaty. The purpose of CTBT is to impose a total ban on all nuclear tests, whether for military or peaceful purposes. It is a follow-up of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) which was signed in 1963 and which prohibited nuclear tests in air and water. The rationale for the CTBT is to discourage nuclear proliferation as a total ban on nuclear testing would dampen the possibility of augmenting nuclear arsenals. Since 1945, more than 2,000 nuclear tests have been conducted, out of which more than 70 percent were conducted by the United States and the then Soviet Union. Along with NPT and CTBT, another measure to prevent nuclear proliferation is the Fissile Material Cut-off treaty which aims to deny the supply of fissile material used for manufacturing nuclear weapons, particularly to those countries that have not signed the NPT and CTBT. Despite efforts made under the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), there are still more than 20,000 nuclear weapons capable of destroying the world several times. It is in this background, that a fresh debate on nuclear disarmament and ban on nuclear testing has been unleashed resulting in severe reaction, particularly from India.

Three important factors shape India's approach on NPT and CTBT. First, since the beginning, New Delhi has held the position that these treaties cannot render positive results unless the "nuclear haves" take practical measures to reduce and then eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Terming NPT as "discriminatory" and an attempt to sustain monopoly of the P-5 in the so-called nuclear club, India particularly questions the failure of Washington to ratify the CTBT. According to Indian leaders, how can the United States ask various countries to sign CTBT when its own Senate has refused to ratify the treaty? Likewise, how can the P-5 demand countries that have not signed NPT to sign the treaty when there is no substantial progress in nuclear disarmament? When the UN Security Council passed a resolution on April 25 this year calling upon countries that had not signed the NPT (like India) to join as non-nuclear weapon states and to comply fully with all their obligations pending their accession to the treaty, the Indian permanent representative to the UN, Hardeep Puri wrote a strong letter to the president of the UN Security Council in which he asserted that, "nuclear weapons are an integral part of India's national security and will remain so, pending non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament. We remain committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. We do not subscribe to any arms race, including a nuclear arms race. We have always tempered the exercise of our strategic autonomy with a sense of global responsibility. We affirm our policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons." The Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh made a point when he said that he got a clarification from Washington that the UN Security Council resolution was not directed against India and that it would not affect the India-US nuclear deal.

It is certain that regardless of the fresh U.S initiative for nuclear disarmament and CTBT, India is not in a mood to acquiesce and intends to maintain its nuclear weapon status. Second, signing the NPT and CTBT without acquiring a legitimate nuclear status from the P-5 is viewed by New Delhi as "political suicide."

If India strives to get a legitimate and recognized position as a nuclear state by the existing de jure nuclear states, Pakistan and other countries possessing nuclear arsenal would also make similar demands, thus augmenting the threat of nuclear proliferation. The P-5 countries are in a fix because if they accept India as a declared nuclear weapons state, the precedent will definitely be counter-productive as it will encourage other countries to manufacture nuclear arsenal and get away with it. The United States and those countries that had imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan following their nuclear tests of May 1998, committed a blunder by lifting these sanctions after the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. It meant that the sanctions failed to have any impact for nuclear non-proliferation but in fact encouraged India and Pakistan, which were called "nuclear rogue states" to further modernize their nuclear arsenal. India was also obliged by the United States when in 2005 the Bush administration signed a civilian nuclear deal with India with permitted New Delhi to carry out its nuclear weapons program and at the same time also pledged to provide nuclear technology to India for civilian purposes. Therefore, India's nuclear ambitions are such that unless it is not given a nuclear status equal to the established nuclear states, it will neither sign NPT nor the CTBT. Third, the nature of domestic politics in India is such that no regime can afford to follow an approach favouring signing NTP or CTBT. Particularly, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which is a major opposition party, has sought assurance from the Indian Prime Minister that India would not sign NPT. Using it as a political ploy, BJP wants to embarrass the Singh government if the ruling party shows a slight sign of weakness on the NPT or CTBT. BJP may even pressurize the government to carry out more nuclear tests in order to modernize India's nuclear arsenal, a situation which will contradict New Delhi's commitment to put a moratorium on nuclear testing. Whether or not the Indian politicians, like their counterparts in Pakistan understand the dynamics of NPT and CTBT, they want to manipulate such technical and sensitive matters for political consumption.

The way out from the present nuclear stalemate primarily exists in the U.S. Senate. If it ratifies the CTBT then the Obama administration can at least argue the case of nuclear non-proliferation from a high moral ground. Although the Democratic Party has a majority in the U.S Senate, it lacks 67 votes to ratify CTBT. Once it ratifies the treaty, it can put substantial pressure on India and Pakistan to become part of the CTBT regime called the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Furthermore, after ratifying CTBT, the United States can work out fresh proposals for deep cuts in nuclear arsenal with Russia and other declared nuclear states, i.e. Britain, China and France. By following these two measures, the P-5 countries can not only ensure CTBT to come into force but can also expect India, Israel and Pakistan to sign and ratify NPT.

Realistically speaking, there cannot be a world totally free of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future but what is possible is a drastic reduction in nuclear arsenals and a total ban on the further augmentation of nuclear weapons programs of nuclear states. From the pragmatic standpoint, India and Pakistan must also realize the futility of nuclear and conventional arms race when the bulk of their population lives in enormous poverty and under-development and the two are far behind other developed states in key sectors of economy and technology. Nuclear ambitions can only make sense if the capability is used for industrial and technological development instead of manufacturing weapons which can only cause a lethal physical and material destruction.

(The writer is Professor & Chairman, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi and Director, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution.)

Moonis Ahmar is a Visiting DAAD Fellow at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany. He is also Professor of International Relations at the University of Karachi and Director, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution.

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