Indo-US Nuclear Pact


Written by S.G. Jilanee • Region • September 2008

Never ask how he did it. But the victory Manmoham Singh won on July 22 was comfortable: 275 to 256. What if “three BJP MPs produced wads of cash in the Lok Sabha, offered to them allegedly by Samajwadi Party to abstain from voting during the confidence motion,” as the Times of India reported. The sum was Rs 10 million.

That was not all. “In a bid to attract three votes from a tiny regional party, the government last week renamed an airport in northern Lucknow after the party chief’s father, Charan Singh, a former Indian prime minister,” said a New York Times report. “One party was reported to be seeking two cabinet posts in exchange for five votes for the government. Another was demanding a smaller state for its regional constituency.”

The victory actually came about due to 'cross-voting’, commonly known as horse-trading. “As many as 14 MPs defied their parties to favour the trust vote, while four went against the whip by abstaining and three simply stayed away,” said Times of India. “Had all of these MPs voted according to their respective party’s diktats, the MPs in favour of the motion would have been 261, those against 277. But herein lies the beauty of democracy.

Manmohan Singh is upbeat. He was photographed giving the thumbs-up sign after winning the confidence vote; his self-assurance further bolstered by the wink and nod from China. At the same time the ASEAN described the deal as an extremely positive step, during the recent ASEAN-India Ministerial Meeting at Singapore.

The deal is Mr. Singh’s cherished dream. The ground for it was broken at his July 2005 summit with George Bush in Washington. Bush followed it up during his visit to New Delhi when the two leaders signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement on March 2, 2006.

Under the bilateral pact, called 123 Agreement, for which the legal framework was provided by the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, (a.k.a. the Hyde Act), broadly speaking, the United States will provide India access to civilian nuclear technology and fuel in exchange for IAEA-safeguards on India's civilian nuclear reactors. The terms of the deal were concluded on July 27, 2007.

The argument in favour of the agreement is that it offers energy security as the nation “currently imports 70% of its oil, which is expected to go up to 90% by mid-century if not sooner. India also lacks supplies of uranium and the deal would allow technology sharing and enable it to buy uranium from the global market. India plans to utilize home grown technology, “particularly the fast-breeder closed cycle process which involves enriching some thorium (of which conveniently India has some 30-odd percent of the global supply) with uranium to start the closed cycle. If India is to maintain its economic boom, it is expected that it will have to increase its energy production from the 125 gigawatts today to over 250 gigawatts by 2016.”

But critics say “it is debatable, how much of this will actually be achieved by boosting nuclear energy generation.” They claim that “nuclear will play a very small role in the overall energy mix.” Nuclear power currently accounts for 3.10% of India’s total energy output. After the 123 Agreement “that figure will rise to 6% (around 16,000 mw) by 2020. This means only a miniscule accretion of 2.9% to India's total energy output over 12 years.”

Controversy also rages around the fact that the agreement might compromise India’s sovereignty over the rights to its own weapons programme. Opponents see it as essentially a diluted version of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that India has persistently refused to sign since the 1970s.

United States had tried for more than 30 years to bring India into the NPT loop, and failed. And it could not coax or coerce India like North Korea or Iran.

The reason is plain. India is a parliamentary democracy, “the world's fourth largest economy, a big financial and consumer market, liberal, secular, English-speaking with Anglo-Saxon laws, judiciary and accounting, a professional bureaucracy and a strong, independent media.”

Therefore, critics say that the Bush administration crafted this new stratagem. The 123 Agreement actually seeks to cap India's nuclear weapons capability in a roundabout fashion. For instance, it does not explicitly bar India from conducting nuclear tests, but if India does test, it says, the agreement will be terminated by the US President. And as soon as it happens, the Nuclear Service Group (NSG) will ask India to return the uranium fuel supplied by them for the country's nuclear reactors.

Founded in 1975, “in response to India’s nuclear test” of 1974, The Nuclear service Group, now comprising 45 nations, is a multinational body “concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapon development and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials.”

But Manmohan Singh is hopeful that he will be able to find ways to circumvent the safeguards and the restriction on testing. The optimism receives support from some reliable sources, such as Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

He observes that the agreement does not bar further Indian nuclear testing and, “incredibly, commits Washington to help New Delhi secure fuel supplies from other countries even if India resumes testing.” It also permits India to “free up its limited domestic supplies for bomb production.”

But the Left parties don’t agree. They allege that under the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which is an offshoot of the 123 Agreement, “India is about to bind its entire civilian nuclear energy programme into IAEA safeguards in perpetuity without getting concrete assurances for uninterrupted fuel supply, right to build strategic reserves and right to take corrective steps in case fuel supplies are stopped.”

Another consequence of the 123 is the Logistics Support Agreement (LSG). The Communist Party’s basic objection to the deal for which it pulled out of the coalition with the United progressive Alliance (UPA) government, was that the LSG, “the steadily escalating joint exercises and the inevitable demand that India purchase expensive weaponry from the United States ties India” to a “strategic relationship with the United States,” Take one example, the costly air exercises would be cost free to the visiting country’s forces; the costs will be borne by the host country. Indian air force participated in such war games in Nevada, as a result, for which the astronomical expenses, were borne by the United States.

Moreover, by going into America’s bear hug, India risks spoiling its relations with Iran, because, in the case of a US attack on that country, India will have to ally itself with the United States.

However, on July 9, 2008, India formally submitted the safeguards agreement to the IAEA. And after the new lease of life to his government Mr. Singh is going full steam to pursue his plans.

On the other hand, while the BJP has dismissed its members who betrayed the party, the Left parties have vowed to start a countrywide agitation against the Deal. How the situation unfolds remains to be seen.