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The SLFP proposal would certainly affect the peace process negatively. International opinions are disregarded which has encouraged human rights violations and the world is turning its back to the Sri Lankan polity, writes Vikram Bedi
At the executive meeting on May 14, 2007 (led by President Mahinda Rajapakse) the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) discussed its devolution proposals. It has been reported that the President would propose a unitary state to the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) on devolution. SLFP has circulated its proposal for public analysis on May 1, 2007. The SLFP proposal is claimed to emanate from the President's platform of "an undivided country, national consensus and an honourable peace," though in its present form it makes a mockery of all these three considerations.  | |
The SLFP proposal includes three aspects of devolution at different levels: abolition of executive presidency, abolition of provinces and creation of districts as the basic unit of devolution. As the SLFP led coalition has a majority in the parliament, the final form of devolution proposal accepted by the parliament is likely to conform more to the SLFP scheme of things regardless of APRC recommendations.
The SLFP proposal bypasses three key basic engines of ethnic conflict: autonomy for Tamil majority areas, northeast merger, and parity of status for Tamil language with Sinhala. Unless these three issues are addressed, no lasting solution can be arrived at, regardless of the semantic nuances of the proposal. The SLFP proposal unfortunately appears to have failed to understand this truth. The SLFP proposal circulated earlier had drawn criticism from all quarters, such as the main opposition United National Party (UNP), anti LTTE Tamil parties and other coalition supporters, particularly on the issue of abandoning a federal concept as the basis for working out a solution. The members of the Tokyo Donors Conference (the EU, Japan, Norway, UK, and USA) and India have also expressed their concern either publicly or privately at the proposal as it cuts at the very roots of the present peace process in which both sides had agreed to find a solution within a federal format. More importantly, the SLFP proposal puts the clock back on the substantial progress made among the Sinhala government and people in understanding the sources of Tamil ethnic conflict. This could impact the future negotiating process also because the proposal fails to evoke sense of security and trust among the Tamil population. These have been echoed by Sinhala intellectuals and politicians who find a greater future in prosecuting peace rather than war.
On the other hand, the hardliners had considered the original SLFP proposal a little soft and wanted a clear emphasis on a 'unitary state.' The party executive has apparently deferred to this lobby and clarified its stand for a unified state. This indicates the strong control the President exercises on the party apparatus. Richard Boucher, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, who visited Sri Lanka in May made an explicit reference to the need for the devolution proposal finding favour with the Tamil community. He said: "I spent a lot of time during my visit talking about the devolution discussion: the prospects of having a set of proposals from this side of the island that can give a perspective to the Tamil community to show them that they have a place of respect, that they have a place on the island, that they have a role in society where they can control much of their own affairs. Only when we have that consensus can we have a basis for peace talks." The SLFP's clarification timed so soon after his statement should send clear signals to the international players of things to come on all fronts in Sri Lanka – war, peace and politics at home and abroad-– in the coming months. Three strategic elements appear to be guiding the government's actions at present. These are military objectives driving political decisions, impact of military successes of 2006, and total focus on the President's agenda. The focus on President's agenda is understandable because that was the basis on which people voted him to power. But it has downgraded the importance of international opinion in decision-making and marginalized Norway's mediatory role. In simple terms, this means the end of the peace process, though for cosmetic reasons the government will continue to talk about peace. The disregard for international opinion has in a way encouraged human rights violations to proliferate, child recruitment to continue, and blunted the rule of law so that rebels can be muzzled and the media intimidated with impunity. The results of this attitude came out loud and clear when the international community did not respond strongly to the recent aerial attacks by LTTE. Germany and UK have frozen part of the aid to Sri Lanka. Recently the British parliament discussed the Sri Lanka situation for four hours and the Minister for Middle East, Dr Kim Howells indicated that he might consider lifting the ban on LTTE, if necessary! There is a move afoot to invite the LTTE spokesman SP Tamilchelvan to address the British parliament members. The influential US watchdog body Freedom House's caution to Sri Lanka sounded more ominous: "Freedom House is deeply troubled by the actions of the government which has imposed restrictions on freedom of expression, harassed non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that question government policy, and committed serious human rights abuses.
The human rights abuses and excessive restrictions on freedom of speech and association by the government merit the country's removal from a list of eligible recipients for Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) assistance." Boucher during his visit had revealed that the USA had decided to postpone MCA projects in Sri Lanka "in view of the unfavourable security situation." It is clear that the international players, while respecting Sri Lanka's sovereignty to take appropriate action to safeguard its security, expect the country to show more positive action to put the peace process back on rails.
The basic problem in Sri Lanka is the change of priorities since 2006. During the first three years of peace process, political objectives were driving military decisions. However, now it has reversed with military objectives driving political decisions. This is evident from President Mahinda Rajapakse's stand during his talks with Boucher. The President declared that "the ongoing war with Tiger guerrillas will continue until they are defeated. If they want the Security Forces to stop the war, the LTTE should lay down arms and come for peace talks. Otherwise, the Government was willing to hold peace talks while fighting Tiger guerrilla terrorism."
This makes the peace process clear and the political issues connected with it have no place in the President's scheme of things at present. The military successes of 2006 appear to have made the state confident of pursuing a military agenda. As polls indicate, military successes have also strengthened the lobbies supporting a military solution. Therefore, it has become a politically attractive course for the President to adopt. Another attraction is that each success at the war front depletes the support base of other political contenders potential like the UNP and the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna. The President is likely to be firm on two issues: unitary format and district level devolution. This is evident from his statement that "the main significance of this whole exercise is that power should remain with the people in a systematic and proper process." In other words, the devolution would be at the decentralized local level and not at the federal level.
To compensate its weakened conventional war capability, LTTE is likely to step up its commando operations in Jaffna peninsula. The focus now would be to carry out decentralized operations to keep the troops from dominating the areas around their defences and forward defended lines. Senior commanders are also likely to be targeted.
And LTTE attacks in the north are more likely to be based on infiltration. Formation headquarters, and storage dumps containing self destructive materials are likely to be the favoured targets. LTTE is likely to continue to fiercely resist any security forces attempt to breach its forward line.
And Colombo port and airport are likely to continue to figure in the priority list of targets for air raids. Of course, VIPs of the government will also continue to remain in the high risk list. Tom Lantos, Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs has articulated a sensible way of salvaging the situation. He said: "I urge all parties to stay true to the Ceasefire Agreement and come back to the negotiating table. A military solution will not end this circle of violence and further escalation will only worsen the already gross human rights abuses. I call upon the international community including diaspora groups, to push all parties towards dialogue rather than destruction." But given the present strategic setting, nobody appears to have time for such a approach. This is clear from the SLFP proposal which is essentially a political document to strengthen the hands of the party, particularly in the south. It is likely to influence the final devolution proposal much more than any other deliberation.
Thus, its singular achievement will be to bury the peace process along with the concept of federalism that forms the backbone of the Oslo Accord. So even if the devolution proposal is presented in the final form as per the President's design, the island nation is likely to continue to struggle along with the flow of military conflict in the coming months. 
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