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South Asia, which was peripheral and marginal for the United States till the end of the second world war, is now strategically, politically and economically a region of enormous interest for Washington. How America views South Asia in the post 9/11 era and why there has been a strategic shift in the U.S. approach vis-à-vis India and Pakistan, the two major countries of the region and to what extent conflicts and instability in South Asia pose a serious challenge to American interests in the region are questions which cause a lot of debate and serious discussion not only in Washington but in the capitals of major South Asian countries.
South Asia, home to one-third of the global population and subsequently home to world’s half poor, caught in a decade-old nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan and a hub of inter and intrastate conflicts, is a major flash point in the world today. Amidst the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unleashing of far-reaching geo-political changes following the emergence of the U.S. as a pre-eminent player in the global order, several adjustments also took place in South Asia in terms of policy options of the major countries of the region. India, which had age-old strategic and political ties with the then Soviet Union, felt itself in a deep quandary when its principal backer had ceased to exist in December 1991. But, it took New Delhi little time to readjust its position and cultivate strong relations with the United States.
Contrary to India, Pakistan which since the 1950s had remained a strategic ally of America felt that it was left in the lurch when Washington, judging the realities of the post-Soviet world, decided to abandon Afghanistan and also imposed sanctions against Pakistan in October 1990. When the then U.S. President George Bush refused to grant a yearly certificate that Islamabad was not involved in manufacturing nuclear weapons, another wall of mistrust and suspicion in Pak-U.S. relations was erected.
The ups and downs in Pak-U.S. relations particularly in the post-cold war era manifested a deep sense of betrayal in the Pakistani mindset about the American failure to understand genuine security needs of Pakistan and treating its so-called ally in a somewhat disrespectful manner. Notwithstanding the renewed closeness in Pak-U.S. relations following the events of September 11, 2011, deep-rooted suspicion and mistrust influenced the two strategic partners. Anti-Americanism deepened in Pakistan because of a variety of reasons, including the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, sustained drone attacks on its territory and its perceived anti-Muslim policies.
Other countries of South Asia such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, following the Indian example, also readjusted their approach and policy vis-à-vis the U.S., particularly after 9/11. All the three countries took advantage of the so-called war on terror to neutralize what they termed “terrorist groups.” Therefore, if the Sri Lankan government was trying to get U.S/Western support against the Liberation Tamil Tigers Ealem (LTTE) by blacklisting that group as a terrorist organization, more or less a similar approach was also pursued by the government of Bangladesh. Unlike Sri Lanka, which faced ethnic violence and LTTE’s terrorist acts, Bangladesh was encountering religious militancy and fanaticism.
If the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) which came to power by forging an alliance with Islamic parties in October 2001 was not considered soft on Islamic groups, the opposition Awami League was trying to remind the United States that the BNP government was not taking strong action against Islamic groups like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI). Interestingly, internal political schism in Bangladesh involving BNP and Awami League tried to drag in the United States and other Western countries when the BNP accused the Awami League of playing politics in the name of counter-terrorism and the Awami League blamed the BNP of not controlling what it called Islamic militant and terrorist groups.
As far as Nepal is concerned, the Nepali government tried to seek American support against the Maoists as it called them a belligerent group pursuing a terrorist agenda. Furthermore, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka tried to take advantage of the so-called U.S.-led war on terror by trying to prove there was a nexus between Al-Qaeda and violent groups active in their own countries.
Afghanistan which is regarded as a West Asian country joined the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) some years ago and is considered as a major destabilizing factor in the three Asias: Central, South and West. Given the fact that the three South Asian Muslim countries, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan are heavily under the pressure of Islamic militant and extremist groups, the United States is compelled to take an effective counter terrorism position.
In all the three countries, anti-Americanism is a reality and a source of popular resentment against the U.S. approach and policy detrimental to interests of Muslims. Be as it may, the most significant challenge which the United States is facing in South Asia pertains to the deep-rooted dislike and hatred against America, a fact, which even some American scholars and experts acknowledge.
India is considered a major beneficiary of changing American policy in South Asia. It is true that unlike India, Pakistan since the 1950s secured billions of dollars of economic and military assistance on various grounds, but it is India which despite losing its strategic ally, i.e. the Soviet Union and pursuing anti-American rhetoric, quickly readjusted its position and was able to earn American goodwill and support in three ways. First, the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal which opened several opportunities for India to seek American nuclear technology.
Second, the U.S. support to India’s age-old dream of gaining a permanent seat in the U.N Security Council and finally, as was done during the visit of the U.S. President Barack Obama to India in November 2010, the United States managed to sign a $10 billion deal with New Delhi which included the sale of sophisticated weapons to India and creating 54,000 jobs in the United States. All the three major pluses in Indo-U.S. relations are criticized by Pakistan, terming them as being against its interests and heavily tilting strategic balance in favor of India in the region. Both India and the United States also developed some sort of strategic consensus on the threat of Islamic non-state actors.
What has happened in the last ten years or so is not only excessive U.S. involvement under the pretext of war against terror but the bankruptcy of American moral and economic power. During the Clinton years, the United States was able to balance its budget and also slash defense expenditures. Now, the U.S. debt is almost equal to its GDP and there is a looming threat of its default. Paradoxically, the U.S. defense budget for 2011 has crossed 700 billion dollars which is more than half of the global military expenditures. If the U.S. has an economic breakdown, it will have far-reaching implications not only impacting the global financial markets but its capacity to play a viable role in South Asia will also be reduced.
Difficult days are ahead not only for South Asia but also for the United States because the economic predicament of America will certainly give more space to other powers like China, Russia, European Union and perhaps some African and Latin American countries to play an effective role in South Asia. And, the ethical-moral gap in U.S. foreign policy will further downside its image. 
Moonis Ahmar is a Visiting DAAD Fellow at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany. He is also Professor of International Relations at the University of Karachi and Director, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution.
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