|
While the Democrats face greater challenges in implementing their foreign policy goals following dominance of Congress by the Republicans, it needs to be remembered that it is only the President of the United States who sets the foreign policy agenda. According to American university professor David Lublin, “America has continuing interests regardless of which party is in power.”
Prior to President Obama’s upcoming December review of the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, a new Council on Foreign Relations sponsored Independent Task Force report on U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan has found that America’s current approach to the region is at a critical point. “We are mindful of the real threat we face. But we are also aware of the costs of the present strategy. We cannot accept these costs unless the strategy begins to show signs of progress,” says the report.
The bipartisan Task Force includes almost two dozen distinguished experts on Pakistan and Afghanistan who represent a range of perspectives and backgrounds. The report has endorsed the current U.S. effort in Afghanistan, including plans to begin a conditions-based military drawdown by July 2011. The U.S. administration’s review would place matters in a clearer perspective and the government will be able to conclude in a much better manner whether the strategy is working. If the conclusion is to the contrary then the current military presence in Afghanistan could be whittled down.
The Task Force was chaired by former deputy secretary of state Richard L. Armitage and former national security adviser Samuel R. Berger and was directed by Daniel S. Markey, a senior fellow at the council for foreign relations. The Task Force has noted that after nine years, the outcome of the Afghan war, there is still uncertain while the stakes are high.
“What happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan matters to Americans,” affirms the report. It warns that “militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan pose a direct threat to the United States and its allies. They jeopardize the stability of Pakistan, a nuclear power that lives in an uneasy peace with its rival, India.”
The Task Force has called for U.S. investment in a long-term partnership with Pakistan, but has stated that this will be only sustainable if Pakistan takes action against all terrorist organizations working from inside its borders. Concrete Pakistani actions against terror groups, it says, “are the bedrock requirements for U.S. partnership and assistance over the long run.” Where Pakistan is concerned, the objective of the United States is to degrade and defeat the terrorist groups that threaten U.S. interests from its territory and prevent turmoil that would imperil the Pakistani state and risk the security of Pakistan’s nuclear program.
On Afghanistan, the report states that the United States seeks to prevent the country from becoming a base for terrorist groups that target the United States and its allies and to diminish the potential that Afghanistan reverts to civil war, which would destabilize the region. It goes on to state that Afghanistan faces the challenges of “pervasive corruption that breeds the insurgency; weak governance that creates a vacuum; Taliban resilience that feeds an atmosphere of intimidation; and an erratic leader whose agenda may not be the same as that of the United States.”
The report states that core American security aims can best be achieved at a lower cost if the United States manages to shift a greater burden to Afghan partners.
“The United States should encourage an initiative with three complementary elements: political reform, national reconciliation, and regional diplomacy.”
The report concludes: “For now, the United States should assume the lead, with the goal of encouraging and enabling its Pakistani and Afghan partners to build a more secure future. Yet even the United States cannot afford to continue down this costly path unless the potential for enduring progress remains in sight. After nine years of U.S. war in the region, time and patience are understandably short.”
The Obama administration and NATO are also looking at whether the war in Afghanistan has made sufficient progress to begin turning security control over to its government by spring, months before the administration’s July deadline to start withdrawing U.S. troops.
The “transition” process may not immediately include troop withdrawals and NATO is expected to state its intention to keep combat troops in Afghanistan until 2014, a date originally set by Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
An “enduring partnership” agreement being negotiated between NATO and Afghanistan will extend security support indefinitely. A bilateral U.S.-Afghanistan accord, similar to the “strategic framework” signed with Iraq when troop-withdrawal deadlines were set there in 2008, will promise long-term economic, diplomatic and security cooperation and is to be completed by January.
As they strive for a common strategy, each coalition member - including the United States - is conducting its own internal assessment of the Afghanistan mission amid high domestic disapproval of the war and pressure to justify its continuance.
Obama’s “surge” strategy was chosen after lengthy debates in which some members of the U.S. administration, including Vice President Biden, favored narrowing the U.S. mission to attacks against al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Others, including the military, successfully argued for a more expanded counterinsurgency strategy, with major governance and development components, in addition to providing security for Afghan civilians.
There is a range of conflicting opinions on both military and civilian progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top coalition commander in Afghanistan, is reported to have told President Obama last September that he expected to report progress in several areas, including large numbers of mid-level Taliban commanders on the ground killed or captured, clearance of Taliban strongholds around Kandahar and the establishment of functioning governance, development of non-military local defense forces and reintegration and reconciliation with some Taliban.
It is clear that the progress on these stated fronts has been poor but the core problem, experts say, is the lack of a set of convincing reasons why Afghanistan is important to U.S. and its coalition partners and what they are trying to do there. It is clear that all this cannot be done in limited time while the cost in blood and money is unacceptable without a solid justification.
July 2011 always had a nice ring to an American public weary of the war. Unfortunately, it also sounded attractive to the Taliban and the Pakistanis who, based on their previous experience, never expected the United States to stay for the long-term anyway. After all those years, U.S. and coalition casualties continue to rise, insurgency spreads and there is no simple answer to why America continues to extend its presence in this part of the world.
With its own economy faltering, the United States has to bolster its credibility to retain an ability to influence global policies. Respecting commitments in Afghanistan should be a major element of this credibility. A positive outcome in Afghanistan is particularly important for the U.S. standing in the eyes of the Muslim world. It must play its due role in reducing extremism globally and decreasing the terror threat to the West in general and the United States in particular.
To avoid collapse and to honor their commitments to the Afghans, it seems that America and its allies will not make any significant withdrawal by July 2011. In fact, all signs point to the coalition digging in for a long-term presence in Afghanistan. 
|
Show/hide comments
Show/hide comment form
