No Easy Game

With 1,300 American men and women dead and billions of dollars spent over the past nine years, America’s Afghan war strategy has yet to show positive results.

Growing reluctance among NATO partners to fight and continue contributing troops, getting nearer of the self-imposed withdrawal date, fear of mounting pressure from American public, particularly in the aftermath of the mid-term polls, and resurging Taliban in Afghanistan are the key issues on the menu before the Obama-led administration.

Besides, regional politics and disputes are the other factors hampering the U.S. march towards an expected victory against the Taliban who had become more united, organized, trained and equipped over the years.

General David H. Petraeus, no doubt, is the best war strategist and his fresh efforts and re-shaping of the Afghan war strategy with surge in number of troops is proof of the current administration’s much serious and urgent approach to Afghanistan as compared to Bush era, but a complete victory against Taliban seem to be easier said than done.

The same can be judged from statements of the U.S. officials and NATO generals who are now more interested in wooing the moderates (if any) among the Taliban with the apparent aim to weaken support for the insurgency as well as create rifts in their ranks and files.

If media reports are to be believed, the last month peace overtures with “top” Taliban representatives in Kabul can rightly be called a step towards the new approach and part of the re-shaped strategy by General David H. Petraeus.

Going through Bob Woodward’s ‘Obama’s Wars’, one can easily find the growing flexibility in the new U.S. approach towards an Afghanistan with Taliban minus al-Qaeda.

Though forced by the fierce resistance from the hardliner militia, the fresh U.S. approach can pave way for an honorable withdrawal from Afghanistan if no victory is coming handy in the days ahead. A settlement with Taliban, if they agree not to foster and allow terrorists on the Afghan soil and to respect human rights, seems to be a logical approach from many aspects.

Looking at the centuries-old tribal structure, education level, disparity among classes, rivalries among clans, tribes and ethnicities and seeds of enmities sown by the three decades of wars and civil strife, no one can expect Afghanistan to be a Jeffersonian democracy even if the Taliban are completely vanished.

Secondly, if the Taliban are accused of human rights violations, the existing lot of men holding key positions in Hamid Karzai’s government or in the two houses of the Afghan Parliament is no different.

Even the hardliner views of some of them, particularly regarding women rights, are not hidden from the public and the international community is struggling hard to win peace for Afghans and sow the seeds of modern democracy in the highly conservative society based on tribalism.

Now that the previous nine years of struggle, thanks to support from the unseen hands and untimely shift of focus from Afghanistan by the Bush administration, have enabled the Taliban a force to be reckoned, the U.S. and its allies are left with little options but to accept them or at least some of them.

It was much easier nine years ago when the rage of the Afghan people against the Taliban regime and their medieval practices was touching the peak and they welcomed the foreign troops as their emancipators, to close the Taliban chapter once and for all by focusing on good governance, provision of basic facilities of life and restoration of peace.

However, call it a state of euphoria or neglect following the unexpected easy and speedy victory against the hardliner regime that the international community forgot their core aims in the country.

The installation of Hamid Karzai in the Presidential Palace following the Bonn Conference was no doubt a victory for the international community, but the common Afghans were in need of jobs, security, health and schooling facilities, construction of roads and bridges, provision of clean drinking water, access to easy and speedy justice and putting an end to corruption.

No one can say for sure how many schools, roads, bridges and health centers were built in the initial years following the overthrow of Taliban regime. Unemployment continued in Afghan cities and rural areas and corruption almost doubled with each passing year.

With all the social problems in face, the unwarranted house searches and civilian casualties in military operations and air strikes further frustrated the Afghans who once again started turning towards another emancipator and the choice was no other than the Taliban who managed to regroup in the tribal areas and border cities of Pakistan.

To put it simply, a complete victory slipped through the hands of U.S. and its allies due to their sheer neglect or misunderstanding of the ground realities which also included the curbing of foreign interference in Afghanistan.

The fresh strategy, being discussed by the U.S.’ top echelons, think-tanks and media these days, is a new approach to winning a war that was already won in the early stage, but the opportunity was lost due to utter neglect of the problems of common Afghans and meddling by the regional powers.

It is still winnable if the new strategy is focused on Afghans, who are the ultimate victims of the more than three decades of fighting, and the regional powers, who are pursuing their own interests in a post-U.S. Afghanistan, disregarding the toll taken by the war on Afghans and the international community.

The recent troops’ surge is not going to show results on the counterinsurgency front unless and until hearts and minds of Afghans are won with the provision of basic facilities.

Decapitation is one option, but this option is being used over the years both in Afghanistan and Pakistan without showing much fruitful results. The other option is to win the common Afghans and let them decide what they want.

Similarly, withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan is one of the much-discussed topics these days and some of the Afghan leaders, particularly those showing sympathies to the Taliban, are supportive of the step. But a hasty withdrawal is going to bring more destruction for Afghans both from the Taliban and the armed-to-the-teeth warlords holding key positions in the Karzai administration.

This will provide an ideal situation for al-Qaeda who are now sheltering in the Pakistani tribal areas but finding it hard to continue their operations with ease in face of the increasing number of U.S. drone strikes.

The regional powers with arch-rival Pakistan and India in particular and countries like Iran, Russia, China, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in general, will not sit with ease. They will rush their men and money to the landlocked country to secure their interests thus fueling more trouble that may culminate at regional instability.

It is admitted by the U.S. officials and by majority of the Afghan war observers that a lasting solution to the Afghan imbroglio will require more years with money and material.

There is no room for doubt about General Petraeus being a great military strategist, but Afghanistan and the situation in Afghanistan and its neighborhood is in many aspects different than Iraq.

Military thrust against the Taliban is one thing, but what is needed the most is to win over the common Afghans by assuring them good governance, jobs, education, health and infrastructure. This seems to be the most viable option to separate the public from the militants.

Negotiation with the Taliban representatives in the ambit of the constitution of Afghanistan by the Afghan government is the second most necessary step towards durable peace. Alongside, the U.S. will need to exert pressure on the regional powers and Afghanistan neighbor to stop meddling in the country and let the Afghans decide their fate.

This is not going to happen in months and needs years and surely, the patience of the American government and public.

Daud Khan Khattak is a political journalist and has written extensively for Foreign Policy, Christian Science Monitor, and London's Sunday Times. He is an expert on the Pakistani Taliban and Pakistani politics. In April 2010, Daud's analysis was featured in "The Battle for Pakistan", a report from the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C. Daud Khattak is also Acting Director at Mashaal Radio, RFE/RLPrague, Czech Republic.

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