Getting Afghanistan Right

Despite the fact that he took several months to deliberate and formulate a revised strategy for the region (the Af-Pak strategy) it has failed to produce commensurate results. Violence has risen to new heights across the whole of Afghanistan and civilian and military casualties have been the highest during this year since 2001. From a Pakistani perspective the war has been pushed into the tribal belt and other parts of Pakistan with considerable loss of life and property. The Taliban and other militant groups have suffered setbacks in certain pockets in Kandahar and other eastern and southern provinces but continue to demonstrate dogged resistance and the ability to bounce back.

President Obama is due to review of the Afghanistan war strategy in December 2010. From the statements made by him and other leaders at the NATO summit conference it is clear that they are committed to a phased withdrawal commencing 2011 to be completed by 2014. However, the July 2011 pull out date had become a huge liability from a political and military standpoint. Allies, adversaries and our own military doubted the resolve and commitment of the U.S. and NATO. To counter these apprehensions the U.S. and NATO are calling it a transition policy and indicating that if the ground situation so warrants they could be present even beyond 2014.

This is supposed to be a message to the Taliban and will surely go a long way in boosting the morale of the U.S. and NATO forces and restoring confidence among the regional countries. The mission beyond 2014 would probably involve training of Afghan security forces and the carrying out limited counter terrorism operations in a supporting role if security situation so demands. This will also allow the U.S. to retain a few bases to pursue its geo-political and strategic interests in the region. There are, however, doubts that in the next four years Afghan security forces will be sufficiently trained and organized to replace ISAF or that the Afghan army will have the professional competence, discipline and national character to take on the Taliban and other major militant groups. The current weakness of the Afghan army and security forces is that Pashtuns are poorly represented even though they constitute nearly 50% of the population. The same problem exists at the national level as Pashtuns have been denied their due representation in the Afghan government due to the hostility of the Northern Alliance that is dominated by Tajiks, Uzbeks and other minorities. The problem is compounded by negative attitudes toward the Pashtun Ghazali and Durrani tribes which are greatly underrepresented.

Within the U.S. there are sharp policy differences between the military leadership and the administration. General Petraeus, a promoter of the military surge, is more focused on a military solution as opposed to the administration, notably Vice-President Biden who seeks a political solution. By undertaking military raids, General Petraeus seeks to win tribal loyalties, encourage them to fight insurgents, and develop pockets of influence that then can be enlarged to provide an alternate to the Taliban model of governance. He probably wants to adapt the Iraqi model with some variations to suit local conditions. On the other hand, the administration is looking for a broader settlement at the national level where disparate ethnic, tribal, and political forces including some elements of Taliban can work out a negotiated settlement.

Washington’s efforts to engage in dialogue with the Taliban have not been successful so far. It has made preliminary contact with several groups and individuals but has not made any headway with the top leadership of the Taliban. As of now the U.S. is not prepared to talk with the Haqqani group and is pressurizing Pakistan to launch a military action against them in North Waziristan. It accuses the military leadership of duplicity, of a double game of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Pakistan is resisting the launch of a military operation in North Waziristan in the immediate future as it would require deployment of a large military force. The army is already overstretched; besides, a military operation in North Waziristan will result in massive displacement of people with its attendant negative consequences. We already have millions of displaced people from South Waziristan, Orakzai, and the flood affected areas that have yet to return to their homes. In addition we have millions of Afghans living in refugee camps awaiting repatriation.

Pakistan’s leaders also are of the view that if U.S. succeeds in opening dialogue with the Taliban’s top hierarchy in the near future it would be imprudent to undertake major operations against Taliban leaders at this stage. The army leadership considers the Afghan Taliban as a countervailing force against Indian influence in Afghan’s post withdrawal power structure. The army and the ISI, by virtue of their contacts since late 90’s, are even willing to act as a facilitator in the dialogue process and are in favor of a political reconciliation process. However, if there is insignificant progress in negotiations it will be detrimental to Pakistan’s interest to allow the Afghan militant groups to take sanctuary in its territory for an indefinite period. In collusion with TTP, the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups are running a parallel administration, violating national sovereignty and destabilizing the country. Their presence has given license to the CIA to launch drone attacks with impunity, further destabilizing our fragile state and violating its sovereignty.

Pressure is also mounting from Washington to expand drone attacks to Baluchistan, targeting Afghan Taliban leadership. As Bob Woodward’s latest book indicates there is an important segment in Washington policy making echelons that believes that after making some noises Pakistanis will start accepting drone attacks in Baluchistan as well. In the event that happens, there likely will be serious political unrest and a terrorist backlash. The Washington Post story that Pakistan has agreed to increased presence of CIA personnel in Baluchistan suggests that Pakistan is prepared to meet America half way. With joint and coordinated intelligence, chances of capturing Taliban leadership could improve. However, Islamabad should not accept deployment of U.S. Special Forces on its soil.

The war on terror (and capturing or eliminating Al Qaeda) is America’s foremost priority. For Pakistan internal stability and neutralizing the insurgency in FATA and KP take precedence. The two goals have a common purpose to make the region a safe place. What is needed is better harmonization of their policies rather than blaming each other for failures and frustrations. The crucial phase of America’s anti-terrorism strategy has started with the announcement of a phased withdrawal. This will require cooperative effort by the regional countries and a long term commitment by the 46 members of the global coalition to remain steadfast. In the final analysis it would depend how the government and the people of Afghanistan decide to shape the destiny of their country.  

Talat Masood is a 3-Star retired Lieutenant General in the Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers. General Masood holds a Masters degree in Defense and Strategic Studies and has also served as a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C.  He was a consultant for the leading U.S. defense manufacturer United Defense, Limited Partnership (UDLP) for five years. He currently writes on national security, weapons proliferation, and has been covering Pakistan and India's nuclear program.

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