Can America Win?

I think that President Karzai is capable of leading his country into the 21st century and stabilizing it. He's got a tough task but the reason we're there ultimately is not to support one man." - President Barak Obama.

President Obama's praise for the Afghan President while speaking to ABC's 7.30 Report in Washington reveals an enormous challenge which the United States faces in Afghanistan. He further rendered his support for Karzai by saying, that "He has the capability to be that strong partner and I think that we're going to have to continue to put pressure on him to make the kinds of reforms and improvements that will not only mean success for us but also ultimately success for him."

When President Obama proclaimed his 'Af-Pak' policy last year, some of the objectives he had in mind while declaring a comprehensive American plan on Afghanistan were confined to dismantling the so-called 'safe havens' of Al-Qaeda and Taliban in the tribal areas of Pakistan, preventing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from falling into the hands of Al-Qaeda and stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan by pursuing a policy of sustaining operations against the resistance groups and ameliorating socio-economic conditions of the Afghan people. Furthermore, the United States also has an objective of denying any space to rival or competing foreign powers in Afghanistan.
The U.S. predicament in Afghanistan is more or less similar to the ordeals faced by the British and Russians from the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1838 to the Soviet intervention in 1979. Both failed to subdue the Afghans. In fact, Afghanistan is the only country in this world that has experienced invasion and occupation by three global powers: Britain, Soviet Union and the United States. Yet, Washington thinks that it can win in Afghanistan and defeat resistance forces led by Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Four important factors should be taken into account while examining American objectives in Afghanistan and its Af-Pak policy. First, around nine years after the dismantling of Taliban regime following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the United States has invested around 100 billion dollars in the name of counter-terrorism operations, drone attacks and under the pretext of rebuilding and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Yet, peace remains as elusive in Afghanistan as it was in the past. In order to overcome frustration because of its debacles in Afghanistan, Washington came up with Af-Pak policy last year. Since the beginning that policy is a non-starter because it is contradictory in nature. Obama administration in its Af-Pak policy argues that the center of instability is in Pakistan and unless the situation in Pakistan stabilizes there cannot be peace in Afghanistan.

The fact is that it is Afghanistan where war, instability, chaos and disorder have caused massive ramifications for the neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan. Second, the Obama administration since coming to power argued that instead of Iraq, the United States should focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan from where the threat of terrorism and extremism exists. For that matter, America followed a policy of military withdrawal from Iraq and surge in Afghanistan. One basic flaw in this objective is the failure of U.S. and NATO forces to liquidate resistance against foreign forces. It is not only in the Pashtun dominated areas of south and south east of Afghanistan where insurgency is so widespread, also in the center and north, resistance is picking up.

When the Taliban regime was dismantled in December 2001, the United States and its allies embarked on an ambitious plan of rebuilding Afghanistan ranging from its armed forces to police, judiciary, administrative structures and educational institutions. One important aspect which was overlooked in that process was the capability and capacity of Afghan regime to deliver. Inundated with scandals of corruption and nepotism, the Karzai government miserably failed to establish its writ not only in the countryside but also in big and small cities and towns.
Third, the United States in its Af-Pak policy believes that in order to curb militancy and terrorism at the global level, it is imperative to dismantle the safe havens of Al-Qaeda and Taliban in the tribal and settled areas of Pakistan. But that is just an eyewash because the drone attacks which have been conducted by the U.S. forces from across the border since 2004 caused more collateral damage than liquidating the so-called safe havens in the tribal areas border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Furthermore, these drone attacks and other coercive military operations in Afghanistan resulted into the surge of anti-Americanism in the vast segments of Pakistani society and led to violent protests and demonstrations. But the problem with the approach pursued by the Congress, White House, Pentagon and other centers of American power doesn't take into account some of the fault lines which exist in its Af-Pak policy. The first major fault line in the U.S. Af-Pak policy is the lack of trust not only between Pakistan and the United States on the matters of countering terrorism but also between Pakistan and Afghanistan on host of issues ranging from preventing cross border infiltration to the alleged role of Indian Consulates based in Afghan cities for destabilizing Balochistan and so forth. Washington's periodic assertion that Pakistan should do more to combat and tract down terrorist groups no doubt expose the fragility in Pak-U.S. relations amidst pledges of America to provide more economic and military support to Islamabad.

Consequent to the U.S. Af-Pak policy and the criticism which is made against American approach on dealing with the Afghanistan, there is the resurgent role of India. New Delhi had expressed its chagrin over the Af-Pak policy as it demanded a major role in Afghanistan. Since Pakistan refused to give any space to India in the process of managing the situation in Afghanistan, New Delhi feels marginalized and argues for not only trade and transit link to Afghanistan via Pakistan but also is involved in training Afghan security forces. Certainly, American objectives in Afghanistan cannot be accomplished unless India and Pakistan remain hostile countries. Afghanistan provides a fertile ground to both India and Pakistan for deepening their proxy war not only in that country but also in other South Asian countries like Bangladesh and Nepal.

Finally, the prevalence of the military-industrial complex and hawkish lobbies in the United States despite the defeat of Republican Party in November 2008 elections is a major impediment for pursuing a pragmatic and rational approach on Afghanistan and on all other issues where there is American involvement. Years of Republican Party's domination in the centers of power deepened the influence of those groups and lobbies who propagated hard line approach to deal with terrorism, militancy and extremism. Obama administration, despite its rhetoric to replace hard power with soft power in some of the world's deadly conflict zones including Afghanistan failed to pursue an approach based on prudence and wisdom. Now, after more than nine years of its military engagement in Afghanistan and with marginal positive results, Washington wants an exit strategy but lacks space to move in that direction because its withdrawal from Afghanistan certainly mean another deadly phase of civil war in that unfortunate country.

Perhaps, America's moment of truth on Afghanistan has arrived because in view of its past and present performance in that war torn country and future challenges, Washington need to take a firm decision: should it bleed more in Afghanistan and protect its surrogate regime in Kabul or it should take immediate steps for its withdrawal in such a manner that those forces who want to again transform Afghanistan as a bastion of terrorism and Islamic militancy are prevented from pursuing that course of action. United States, its allies and all stake holders who have their vital interests in Afghanistan must think in terms of protecting the people of that country from another phase of bloodshed. The task is difficult but not impossible.

Moonis Ahmar is a Visiting DAAD Fellow at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany. He is also Professor of International Relations at the University of Karachi and Director, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution.

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