Honeymoon’s over, but Holidays continue


Written by S.G. Jilanee • Cover Stories • September 2008

The honeymoon is over. Alas, too soon. The ‘wedding’ happened with such fanfare it looked like there would be long honeymoon. But, quite ironically, the otherwise salubrious ambience of Bhurban proved unhealthy for it. The beau threw tantrums and, in a huff, withdrew his ‘wedding gifts’ from the federal cabinet. However, it is not going to be a divorce yet, but separation seems almost certain.

According to a latest report from London. “Nawaz Sharif proposes to have a ‘final word’ with PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari when the two meet later this month.” And his agenda? “Rule of law, …. independence of judiciary, restoration of deposed judges, blocking army intervention for all times to come, establishment of parliament’s supremacy, no to foreign dictation, accountability and institution of treason case against Gen (retd.) Musharraf.” (Dawn 16 July 2008)

In fact, the Pakistan People’s Party-Muslim League (N) coalition was jinxed from day one. Even at the best of times this patently unnatural union made little sense. It was like a coalition of the Republicans and Democrats in the US, Conservatives and Labour in UK and Congress and BJP in India, to quote three ready examples.

Nowhere in the world do major rivals form a coalition, for the simple reason that they run on different agendas and manifestos, often opposed to each other. Actually, what major rivals in a multiparty system ordinarily do, is canvass support from smaller parties and independents. Whichever is able ultimately, to cobble an overall majority, forms the government. Rival parties may unite only during a national emergency. But, in that case the ‘national government’ so formed is composed of all parties.

But trust Pakistanis for the funniest antics. The PPP-ML (N) coalition was the biggest joke ever to happen in the history of parliamentary politics. Yet, all the denizens of this animal farm raised a cacophonic chorus of hosannas to extol the feat that Z&N had pulled off. Worse, they even had the temerity to call it an evidence of the duo’s political maturity!

Yet, was it? Was it the proof of their political maturity or the testimony to the intellectual immaturity of those who gave this circus such a profound name? Political maturity would be if they refrain from repeating their past abominable behaviour towards each other.

Political maturity would also mean a flexibility of approach to issues and abandoning intransigence. But it is too early to hazard any judgment about the first, while, on the second Nawaz has shown no sign of change. He is still as intransigent and inflexible as ever with regard to his major obsessions, namely restoration of Iftikhar Choudhry and putting Pervez Musharraf to trial for treason.

When Benazir was prime minister and Nawaz the chief minister of Punjab, they were engaged in an ugly confrontation. The latter almost refused to recognize her as the PM. She retaliated with other pin pricks; the Jonathan bringing scrap for Nawaz’s steel foundry was not allowed to berth at Karachi Port; she called him an ”ironmonger’s son” and, once, even had his father arrested.

When it was Nawaz’s turn, he struck with the “Sword of Allah” (Saifur Rahman),slapping Benazir and her spouse with a slew of corruption cases. In fact it was these cases, not Gen. Musharraf that drove her into exile.

Benazir-Nawaz relations during their self-exile are no guide, either, to their political maturity. Sailing in the same boat, it was only natural for them to seek solace in the warmth of each other’s embrace. It was not a consensual union but forced by expediency. Nawaz was desperate to forge a joint front against Pervez Musharraf as evident from his advance offer of the office of prime minister to Benazir in the first general election, even if his party won an overall majority.

That was a period of rare camaraderie. They sang the sweetest songs about democracy and swore solemn vows of fidelity. They even became ‘siblings!’ Yet, each remained wary of the other. Commitment to democracy was the only point on which they agreed. Beyond that each followed their separate policies, which even conflicted with the other’s. Even in their support for the return of democracy, they differed on its ‘modus operandi.’ For example BB favoured dialogue and a mutual understanding with Gen. Musharraf. Nawaz, bristling with anger, would have none of it.

In fact Nawaz had signalled the parting of the ways, even during Benazir’s lifetime, when he abandoned the ARD, because Benazir was its chairwoman, and launched APDM under his personal leadership.

It is not possible now to surmise what would have been Benazir’s approach towards the ML (N) had she been alive. But it is quite likely that she would not have gone for the farce of ‘coalition.’

Of course Zardari had certain compulsions. Shining in the light borrowed from his wife through their son, he must have felt insecure. Reconciliation with and goodwill of all like-minded parties would boost his self-assurance. He therefore extended his hand of friendship to the ANP, JUI (F) and MQM. But what motivated him for the unusual step of forming a coalition with his arch political rival, Nawaz Sharif, may have been his intention to prevent PML (N) from sitting in the opposition, rather than any feeling of insecurity or other altruistic motive, per se.

By any yardstick, PPP and ML (N) are incompatibles. Benazir Bhutto was inducted into politics by her father, who was a political celebrity. Nawaz Sharif was introduced into politics by a military general. One’s foe has been the other’s friend. In the past it was Ziaul Haq. Today it is Musharraf. The former patronized Nawaz; the latter befriended Benazir. He hates Musharraf, she loathed Zia. Benazir was close to the Americans, Nawaz distant. She was classed as a liberal; he is known as a rightist.

Yet, Nawaz feigned a lofty disdain for public office for his party to decline Zardari’s invitation to share power, because, his party could not take the oath of office from Musharraf. However, he generously reassured Zardari of his party’s support, nonetheless. This was a ploy to test the latter’s sincerity.

When he found Zardari determined, he decided to exact the price. Boasting that he does not take dictation from anyone, he started dictating Zardari. He began with expressing “reservations” at Zardari’s decision to include MQM in the coalition and took to the climax with the Bhurban Declaration, which, not only proclaimed a 30-day deadline for judges’ restoration, but also laid down the procedure for doing so.

But, for Zardari, as leader of the largest party in the legislature, it would have been obviously suicidal to submit to such dictation. And when he did not, as was expected Nawaz pulled away his ministers.

Since then he has been using all the tools he can, from rhetoric to the magic of, what Benazir once called, ‘chamak,’ to raise his public stature and reduce Zardari’s. His speeches are tailored to universal appeal, while the magic of chamak takes care of the media.

An example is a story from Rauf Klasra, saying that Zardari has invited Nawaz “to accompany him to the US in a bid to convince the White House and the State Department to let them get rid of President Pervez Musharraf so as to stabilise Pakistan.” The report links the invitation to Nawaz’s decision “to get tough with Asif Zardari,” and recalls that, “earlier, Nawaz had rejected an invitation to accompany Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani to Saudi Arabia.” (The News; 17 July 2008) Yet, the holiday will go on some more. Nawaz will remain in the coalition and chip away from within rather than snap relations. Time for that is not yet. He knows that the stakes are too high for any reckless gamble.