Strategic Continuum |
| Written by Dr. Moonis Ahmar • April 2011 |
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Title: Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security examines four important themes. First, historical and political framework of Indian policies and their influence on the formulation of India’s nuclear weapons policy and its doctrinal foundation. Second, evolution of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability and its influence on India’s nuclear decision-making. Third, the evolution of Indian nuclear doctrine and finally, growth and development of Indian nuclear deterrence in South Asia. The author argues that BJP’s coming to power in 1998 and carrying out nuclear tests in May 1998 was a final set back to the policy to keep India a non-nuclear weapon state which provided a convenient rationale to the Pakistani leadership with its Indo-centric mindset to carry out their nuclear tests. (p. 506). The book under review argues that “the central premise of this study is that the decision to carry out the May 1998 nuclear tests by the BJP government was not inherently an original one, but a step prefigured in a strategic continuum whose genesis dates back to the 1950s.” Some of the questions raised by the author in his well researched book are: What if deterrence were to fail? What is the economic cost to India and Pakistan for developing nuclear forces? What is the nature of additional nuclear scenarios, which the Indian decision-makers incorporate in their policy formulation, other than those which are Pakistan and Chinese related? Furthermore, the most crucial question which needs to be addressed is: how credible is Indian nuclear deterrence for peace and stability in South Asia while fulfilling India’s strategic objectives associated with it? The book tries to respond to questions raised by the author. Some of the unique features of the book under review which makes it useful for researchers and policy-makers working on South Asian strategic studies to read are the sources, both primary and sources, and an in depth analysis of Indian nuclear doctrine right from its formative phase till the first decade of 21st century. Furthermore, the book evaluates the interaction between the Indian nuclear deterrence and the most critical issue of strategic stability in South Asia. The book also discusses the structural dimensions of India’s nuclear weapons program like National Command Authority (NCA), Cabinet Committee on Security and Strategic Forces Command. Pakistan will certainly be at the centre of Indian nuclear policy but the question is the lack of viable interaction and coordination between New Delhi and Islamabad on ensuring nuclear stability in South Asia. On the whole the book provides useful information and analyses on the evolution and growth of Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs and the dynamics of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. It is highly recommended for reading as a text book in the field of strategic studies.  Moonis Ahmar is a Visiting DAAD Fellow at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany. He is also Professor of International Relations at the University of Karachi and Director, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution. Comments (0)
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Much has been written on the subject of nuclear proliferation in South Asia but the book under review is the only comprehensive study which depicts Pakistani perspective on the issue of Indian nuclear deterrence and its implications for the South Asian security. When India conducted nuclear tests on May 11, 1998 and emerged as the world’s sixth nuclear state soon followed by Pakistan, two major questions were raised: first, how the overt nuclearization of India will impact on Pakistan and the region and second, how New Delhi will formulate its nuclear doctrine while taking into account the deterrence factor?
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