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From a businessman and cricket commentator to a government employee and a quiet diplomat must have been like a metamorphosis for Jamsheed Marker. To borrow his favorite expression, it was a real "chiaroscuro." Here he was his own boss, rubbing shoulders with all kinds of people and at his leisure, giving an eloquent running commentary on the game. There he was in the straitjacket life of an employee, who must choose his words and his contacts with care and discretion. Indeed, Marker had a taste of this change soon after joining his new calling when he was invited to give his last commentary and was pleasantly surprised to discover that he had to have prior permission from the "competent authority" for the engagement. And, to obtain the permission, he was required to answer a long questionnaire as well as submit a copy of the "script" of his "speech" to which he must adhere. (He got the permission anyway and without hassle.)
Title: Quiet Diplomacy: Memoirs of an Ambassador Author: Jamsheed Marker Publisher: Oxford University Press, U.S.A. (April 15,2010) Pages: 460 pages, Hardcover Price: PKR. 795 ISBN-10: 0195477790 ISBN-13: 978-0195477795 But he adjusted himself to his new job ideally and proved as successful in it as he had been in the old. For twenty-nine years (1965-94) he served as Pakistan's ambassador in Africa, Europe, North and Central America, as well as Japan and the United Nations. The list is quite impressive: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Romania, Bulgaria, USSR, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Iceland, Ireland, France, Canada, U.S.A., Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago. In his memoirs which he has titled ‘Quiet Diplomacy', Jamsheed Marker recounts the events in his career as Pakistan's envoy, his successes and his frustrations and the foibles of rulers and political leaders. The thumbnail sketches of many world leaders, including Reagan, Mitterand, Podgorny, Brezhnev, Kosygin, et al he came in contact with and had occasion to observe at close quarters, provide a peep into their minds. Marker's first posting was to Ghana with concurrent accreditation to Guinea and Mali from 1965 to 1967. At the time Ayub Khan was at the peak of his glory. But by the time he returned after completing his stint, major events had occurred in Pakistan. Ayub's popularity graph had plummeted and there were signs of unrest. So, when he was posted to Eastern Europe, Marker left "with the conviction that the foundations of the old order ....had received a major jolt and things were about to change." After spending the next two years, 1967-69, in Romania and Bulgaria, Marker was posted to Moscow-cum-Finland. This was a truly challenging assignment that would test his diplomatic talents to the utmost. The earlier period was practically eventless by contrast, except for Ayub Khan's 1967 state visit to Romania. But the Moscow posting was different. At the time Marker took up his new assignment in late 1969, Ayub had resigned under severe political pressure and Yahya Khan had taken over. Though initially, there was calm, but it was only cosmetic. Pakistan stood at the cusp of a mighty upheaval that would soon shake it to its foundations and break it asunder, though it was too early at the moment to predict. Of all Marker's diplomatic assignments, the one in the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1972 was the most eventful, because it was the most critical period in Pakistan's history. It eclipsed in importance even his subsequent job with the United Nations, despite its call for high caliber diplomacy. Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union after Yahya's takeover started on a positive note. When Yahya visited Moscow in 1970 at the invitation of the Soviet Union, the occasion was marked by its profusion of warmth and conviviality from the start. For example, on arrival Yahya and his party were served a sumptuous meal. After the dinner President Podgorny and Prime Minister Kosygin each started toasting Yahya with glasses of vodka. But Yahya turned up trumps saying after the fourth toast, ‘Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, I feel that this is not very fair. I know what you are trying to do. But there are only two of you against me. And that is not fair for you. I warn you that I can easily handle four of you.' This made Kosygin laugh. "He threw up his arms and promptly put his upended glass on the table." Negotiations proceeded satisfactorily. Agreements were reached on the Steel Mill and trade and all was hunky dory. But, from March 1971, after Yahya's military action in East Pakistan, they began to get sour. As Soviet support to India in its belligerence against Pakistan increased, its relations with Pakistan plummeted, reaching their perigee with the Soviet veto of the ceasefire resolution in the Security Council after India invaded East Pakistan. For the initial few months of Yahya's military operations in East Pakistan, the Kremlin maintained a "semblance of balance between India and Pakistan." In his meeting with the author in the last week of June 1971, Kosygin had reassured him about Soviet Union's continued economic collaboration and non-interference in the internal political affairs of Pakistan. But two unfortunate incidents changed it all. The first was Henry Kissinger's secret flight to Beijing from Rawalpindi in July 1971. As Professor Yuri Gankovsky summed it up in his talk with the author, "It had the same effect in Moscow as when the U-2 flew from Peshawar." The Sino-American détente put Indo-Soviet cooperation into high gear which led to the signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in the following month. A fence-mending attempt through a visit by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan in early September was foiled by Yahya Khan's proclamation a few days ago threatening to attack India if it assisted the Mukti Bahini in seizing a piece of territory in East Pakistan to declare an independent Bangladesh. At his meeting with Sultan Khan, Kosygin was openly rude. When the interpreter added "please" to his admonition in Russian saying, "Do not take any action that should oblige us to fulfill our obligations to a country with whom we have a Treaty of Friendship," he intervened to clarify that he had not said, "please." However, its mission accomplished, Moscow‘s attitude towards Pakistan began to thaw. In March 1972 Kosygin invited Pakistan's new president, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. But this visit was in sharp contrast to Yahya's. Kosygin, who had been affable on that occasion sat "stony faced," unmoved by Bhutto's oratory and personal charm and concluded his stern presentation with the remark that, "if these events are repeated, and we are once again confronted with the same situation, then I tell you that we will act in exactly the same manner as we have done." Bhutto's meeting with Brezhnev was, however, more successful. The author has discussed the developments during these four years in meticulous detail often reproducing the conversations with Soviet top brass, which not only reveal some less known facts, but also stimulate some reflection. For example, the much-hyped Polish Resolution had become innocuous because the ceasefire it envisaged had already become a fait accompli hours before the resolution was tabled before the Security Council. It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union went all out in its support to India. But Pakistan did not receive any significant support from the United States. And, even, with regard to blocking Bangladesh's entry into the UN, it was China that used its veto at Pakistan's request. The narrative sparkles with some humorous incidents like how Second Secretary Riaz Khokhar once got the "Order of Lenin imprinted on his cheek." Each chapter ends with a number of interesting anecdotes and "running commentary" on the domestic situation. One relieves any stress; the other updates the reader to correlate diplomatic activity with the situation at home. Finally there are some rare photographs to provide value addition. Postscript: At p.77 the entry that "President Yahya Khan visited the Soviet Union in the summer of1971" is a gross error. The year was 1970.  Reviewed by S.G. Jilanee The writer is a senior political analyst.
S. G. Jilanee is a senior political analyst and the former editor of Southasia Magazine.
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