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 South Asia has acquired more significance in world affairs over the past decade than it enjoyed in centuries. However, the U.S. continues to pay more attention to some nations in the region while the others feel neglected.
Like Julius Caesar's Gaul, in Barack Obama's Washington, all South Asia is divided into three parts. Afghanistan and Pakistan, separate but inextricably linked, present the Obama administration with perhaps its most serious national security challenge. The administration freely acknowledges that India will be one of the 21st century's major players, but New Delhi remains uncertain of the depth of Washington's commitment. And the remaining countries of the region - Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives - struggle to find anyone in the upper reaches of the administration who will pay attention to them.
The division of labor within the administration reflects this fragmented view of South Asia. Richard Holbrooke is the administration's point man on "AfPak," but ultimately shares responsibility with - and is sometimes overshadowed by - senior officials in the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and ultimately the White House. Both Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have given India personal attention - witness Obama's highly unusual attendance last month at a State Department reception for visiting Indian officials - but such top-level interest is episodic rather than sustained. A low-profile assistant secretary of state is customarily the most senior administration interlocutor for the other five South Asian states.
Obama's South Asia policy begins with Afghanistan. Through both his rhetoric and his escalation of U.S. troop levels, Obama has made the war there his own. Yet, American political and military timetables for Afghanistan may not be in sync. Obama has pledged to begin the drawdown of U.S. forces in mid-2011; many wonder whether the security situation in Afghanistan will justify such a move. Washington has repeatedly insisted that it will not cut and run from Afghanistan. Such promises, however, though no doubt sincere, fail to provide a path forward if the Taliban refuse to abide by American timelines.
To Afghanistan's east, Pakistan and the United States are entwined in an embrace of mutual need and mutual suspicion. Pakistan is crucial for America because the war in Afghanistan cannot be won without Islamabad's cooperation. But such a formulation misleads - Pakistan is important to Washington in its own right, for both positive and negative reasons. American interests benefit from a secure, stable, and prosperous Pakistan, while a failing Pakistan would unleash a host of problems, including terrorism, unsecured nuclear technology, and destabilizing refugee flows.
Bilateral relations between Washington and Islamabad are snarled by a huge assortment of suspicions and animosities that is sometimes misleadingly labeled a "trust deficit." In fact, the gap dividing the two countries may be more substantial than merely inadequate trust. Many analysts wonder whether the two countries define their respective core interests in such a way as to justify the hope they can work together.
In the face of intelligence that the New York Times Square car bomber had links to the Pakistani Taliban, and the blurring of lines between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, there is a new urgency to U.S. insistence that Islamabad do more to crack down on Islamic extremist groups in Pakistan. Such exhortations infuriate many Pakistanis, who argue that these demands belittle the sacrifices Pakistanis have already made in fighting extremism.
In an effort to create a broader partnership between the two countries, the U.S. Congress has authorized a $7.5 billion, 5-year package of non-military aid to Pakistan, in addition to the billions that the Pentagon will provide the Pakistani military. The intense public anger in Pakistan last fall (much of it stirred by hyperbolic media comment) over the so-called conditions attached to the proffered aid underscored just how deep the distrust between the two sides is.
 Nonetheless, the Obama administration and the U.S. Congress are both committed to a substantial aid program, which will, in the first instance, focus on energy, agriculture, and education - areas consciously chosen to address the needs of the Pakistani people and not simply their political or military leaders. Still, there are serious concerns about how quickly and effectively this aid can be disbursed. Pakistanis, moreover, rightly note that while $1.5 billion per year represents a substantial increase over anything Washington has provided in the past, the figure is still miniscule in comparison to Pakistani needs, or to what the United States is spending next door in Afghanistan.
The March 2010 "strategic dialogue" in Washington helped stabilize relations after another rocky patch. Whether it imparted a real stability to the partnership, however, remains to be seen. The relationship is extraordinarily fragile, hostage to developments over which neither government has full control. U.S. failure in Afghanistan could have a deleterious effect on Pakistani interests. Another attack on the United States emanating from Pakistani soil could similarly throw the bilateral relationship into a new tailspin.
Looking farther east, Obama has repeatedly underscored his desire for a fuller partnership with New Delhi. His recent National Security Strategy report singles out India, along with China and Russia, as a rising power that will help mold the world in the 21st century. India was given the honor of the only state visit of Obama's first year in office. The American president intends to journey to India later this year; Pakistan has received no similar commitment.
Nonetheless, Washington's desire to work closely with Pakistan creates difficulties for its India agenda. Whereas the United States insists that Islamabad's assistance in the fight against Al Qaeda and its Taliban friends is essential, New Delhi regards Pakistan as the crux of the terrorism problem, not part of the solution. This fundamental difference of outlook will continue to limit the degree to which India and the United States can build a partnership centered on anti-terrorism.
Washington is keen to see India and Pakistan move beyond their historical animosities. The administration is realistic about its limited ability to push its two most important South Asian partners toward friendlier ties, but is eager to play a facilitating role should one become feasible. Toward this end - but also because Washington believes it is in the interest of Pakistan to do so - the administration is continually urging Islamabad to crack down on Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and similar groups that have long targeted India.
Indeed, another Mumbai-type attack from groups based in Pakistan is one of the jokers clouding the future of U.S.-India relations. The Indian government would be hard pressed to exhibit the same forbearance it displayed after the 2008 Mumbai assault, and a sharp escalation of Indo-Pakistani tensions, or even the outbreak of armed conflict, would constitute a huge nightmare for Washington.
U.S. ties with China also unsettle New Delhi. The administration has sought opportunities to consult and coordinate with Beijing on matters pertaining to South Asia. This attitude - and notably, the joint U.S.-Chinese statement last November about the need for Beijing and Washington to work together in South Asia - has caused India considerable heartburn. China's longstanding friendship with Pakistan and, more recently, an agreement by China to sell Pakistan several nuclear energy plants also alarm New Delhi, which pointedly asks why the United States does not use its (assumed) influence with Beijing to promote Chinese behavior less threatening to Indian interests.
 The Obama administration's approach toward the remainder of the region is notable primarily for its continuity with previous administrations. Bangladesh, the largest country in this group, fails to demand U.S. attention because it is neither spectacularly successful nor abysmally failing. Washington worries about growing instability in Nepal and the inability of the principal Nepalese political parties to work together to promote responsible democratic governance and economic prosperity. In Sri Lanka, satisfaction at the end of the civil war and at the demise (one hopes) of the Tamil Tigers has been tempered by the course of developments over the past 12 months - notably, the growing concentration of power in the hands of the Sri Lankan president and his family, and the absence of reconciliation with the minority Tamil community.
The United States joined SAARC - the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation - as an observer several years ago; Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake attended the SAARC summit in Thimphu earlier this year. Washington has long been frustrated by the ineffectiveness of SAARC and would like to see greater regional integration and cooperation. Here, perhaps, is an area where the region's smaller nations might work together and in tandem with the United States.
History and human agency have given South Asia a centrality in world affairs over the past decade that it has not enjoyed in centuries. In the decades preceding 9/11, South Asians frequently lamented Washington's unwillingness to pay them the attention they thought their due. Afghans and Pakistanis are not likely to hold Barack Obama guilty of similar inattention, nor should Indians, even though New Delhi will continue to fret that its importance is underappreciated in Washington. But, barring catastrophe, the region's remaining countries will once more struggle to make their voices heard in the cacophonous capital of the distracted superpower. 
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