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‘Deeds speak louder than words.'
Mian Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri is a seasoned diplomat and politician and was the Foreign Minister of Pakistan from 2002 to 2007. In this exclusive interview to SouthAsia, he talks to Rabia Aamir about various issues facing Pakistan.
You have stated on several occasions that during your tenure as foreign minister, Pakistan and India came very close to solving the Kashmir issue. How close did we come? Can you please share with us some details?
What I said was that as far as Kashmir is concerned, 80% to 90% of the sketch had been made and what we were waiting for was the Prime Minister of India to come here. We hoped he would sign the agreement on Sir Creek which was more or less ready for signature. We had had a joint survey done and once he had signed, there would be a feeling that Pakistan and India could resolve issues bilaterally. Even the Indus Basin Treaty was presided over by the World Bank, so it would be a great thing if we could resolve Sir Creek bilaterally - it would be a great step. The 90% of the outline that had been finalized would set the stage for the resolution of the remaining points on Kashmir.
What were the key elements that enabled both countries to come so close to success?
In our tenure we encouraged a lot of people-to-people contact and I think it created a critical mass throughout South Asia - journalists meeting each other, SAFMA, students going on visits, although not to each other's universities because that is still not allowed. All this was a great help. It set the stage for us to achieve something more concrete in what we were doing on the back channel as well as in the composite dialogue. We realized that no matter what we achieved, unless the settlement was not accepted by the Kashmiris we would not carry the public will in Pakistan. We had a lot of negotiations with the Kashmiris in Pakistan, in India and abroad. I also met the Diaspora. There were two key elements: the Kashmiris wanted to be sure that they would be freed of the Indian army's presence as it was a big problem as far as they were concerned. Secondly, they felt that the level of self-governance they had in 1947 had been whittled away and slowly they were being turned into a province or a northern Indian state. They were petrified. We negotiated with the Indians about self-governance for both sides. Basically, the Kashmiris were keen and a deal was reached about gradual demilitarization - the army would be withdrawn from the cities and the number of troops would also be reduced. Secondly, regarding self-governance, as far as the Kashmiris were concerned, the Indians were saying that they could not change the border and nor could we, so we had to be creative in finding some method by which we could tell the people. Pakistan has fought five wars with India, there is nuclear parity in South Asia, so what were we going to do? If you had a greater sense of stability, it would result in not only lesser expenditure on defence but the fact that there would be political and economic stability which would bring in a lot of foreign investment and encourage local investors to go in for long-term projects. It would encourage Indian and Pakistani investors to invest in each other's countries. Every political party in Pakistan has supported a negotiated settlement. If India were to show flexibility, we would reciprocate. As far as the Kashmiris are concerned, there would be no question of any passport or visa. There would be no border - it would cease to exist and all they would need would be ID cards. We created a mechanism - a body of Kashmiris with Indian and Pakistan oversight and we agreed that neither would proclaim a victory.
What happened then? Why didn't your government pull it off?
Unfortunately, the Chief Justice's movement started right then and there was no sense (in pursuing with the settlement) as the nation had lost its focus. They were only interested in one issue. Secondly, the media we felt would not judge on merit. They would have a jaundiced view and would not approach the matter in an impartial manner because the rancor on that matter would overshadow their objectivity. I advised the President at that time not to go ahead. The Indians, I'm sure, realized the same. Dr. Manmohan Singh has admitted that we had reached a settlement on Kashmir.
Moving to the conflict in the north, has the U.S. demand that Pakistan should 'do more' subsided or is it still as vehement, considering the successes our armed forces have achieved over recent months?
Pakistan is already doing a lot and we have ten times the amount of force deployed in the area. We have suffered a number of causalities and we have, I think, managed to set an example through the success of our military operation in Swat, Malakand and the tribal areas.
Following the strategic talks that the Pakistan army chief and foreign minister held in Washington, do you feel Pakistan has succeeded in impressing upon the Americans that it merits better treatment than what it has received so far?
To understand strategic dialogue you must understand history. It started during our period when we told the Americans that the Pakistani public felt America was far too focused on one issue - America's security - whether it was the containment of the former Soviet Union during the cold war or during the Afghan jihad or later during the civil war in Afghanistan, when, after 9/11, it were the Taliban in Afghanistan that needed to be combated - Pakistan was always put as an ally.
Within Pakistan, for this reason, there had risen a lot of animosity. So they needed to have a more sustained relationship - what we call a deeper and a wider relationship. Since you just don't talk of security matters only, we expanded it to education and that meant that during our time we had the largest Fullbright Program in the world. Pakistan and the United States tried to develop a relationship between universities, then agriculture, technology - all this was included and there was the regular strategic dialogue on an annual basis.
We thought of it in precisely this order: widen the relationship so that the people of Pakistan feel that the United States is not only interested in its own affairs for its own purposes but that it does care about the long-term well-being of the Pakistani people. From that angle, I think, the strategic dialogue went well and it seems there was a lot of understanding amongst the two sides. The United States has been saying repeatedly, and I hope it will fulfill its word, that they will help us and our needs for energy demands. The Americans do try to make a distinction at the moment between energy needs and the civil nuclear deal with India but I think the time is coming slowly and gradually, and that was our assumption when, during our period, President Bush said if we went for this deal, we would continue to make demands on him.
I was asked at that time if India has got it and I said, "It is only a matter of time. I don't see it happening overnight but there is the NPT Conference going on and Pakistan's help would be needed for yet another important item to come on the international agenda, which is preventing nuclear material from falling into the hands of terrorists. Pakistan can play a positive role and the U.S. needs Pakistan to play it. I think over a period of time this will happen."
I have been on record as saying that Pakistan, Israel and India are three countries that are not signatories to the NPT. Therefore, since we did not violate any NPT rules we should be treated differently. We are already a declared nuclear power but we are generating more expensive electricity. At the moment we have to make do with 300 megawatt reactors. All the United States is doing is forcing us to make more. The government of Pakistan is trying to make America understand but I do not see it happening soon though it will happen in due course.
Do you see any changes in the Af-Pak policy?
I think there is great understanding about Pakistan's concerns. They need to understand our sensitivities there. I have been meeting Americans who pass through the area and they come to Lahore to meet me. I also find that there is greater understanding amongst the visiting Americans about Pakistani sensitivities.
Pakistan is continually pressurized by the U.S. on the proliferation issue. What should it do to finally settle it?
It is not pressurized. The international community is rather sensitive. Ever since we created the NCA, our nuclear weapons are in secure hands and we have the great advantage that such security brings. Slowly, as we behave a little responsibly about this, the AQ Khan affair will be forgotten. We are a nuclear power, we have civil nuclear energy but we have smaller reactors so the U.S. does not achieve much.
We need to create that level of trust in the community and I think, as time passes, the international community will realize that Pakistan has done what all other nuclear powers have done to protect their nuclear weapons. NPT provides that there will be no nuclear commerce with non-signatories and we are non-signatories. But as time has passed, with India being a nuclear power and a non-signatory, I think there is very little moral authority the U.S. has in denying Pakistan as long as we show the world that we are a responsible nuclear state. During my term we adopted all measures to make sure our nuclear weapons were secure, it is just a matter of time.
The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake openly objected some time back to Pakistan signing a gas pipeline deal with Iran.
We went ahead during our tenure on the gas pipeline. We are an energy-starved country and we have no alternatives because Iran is our neighbor - a friendly neighbor. So the requirements of bilateral relationships are very important in this case. Unfortunately the Americans and Pakistanis did not agree when I was foreign minister but we decided to go ahead. We arrived at a cheaper price but that has since been increased. When I was Foreign Minister, President Ahmadinejad sent me his special aircraft to discuss this with me. He told me that very soon he would be calling President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Tehran to sign the agreement but I don't know what happened after I left.
What chances are there for Pakistan to gain access to U.S. markets?
The problems are really with the two Carolinas - North and South- and the textiles. But I think apart from that, during our tenure, we were working on an agreement whereby if certain products were manufactured on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, they would have entry into the U.S. markets on reduced or no tariffs. They promised it would be done and I have recently read that they are revisiting that, which will be a good thing. The U.S. can also help us to speak to the EU and gain greater access there. The two Carolinas are not really our competitors and we even agreed to discuss a list of items that we do export to make sure they do not conflict with what the Carolinas produce.
President Obama stated during his visit to Afghanistan that he would like to end the U.S.'s direct involvement in the country? Do you see it happening soon?
They will have some presence as they would not have made such great investments as the Bagram base. I have no doubt that they plan to remain there.
Could Pakistan play an effective role in facilitating the U.S. effort to open lines of dialogue with various pro-Taliban Afghan leaders?
Historically, Pakistan has had a lot of influence with the Afghan mujahedeen and the ISI has had such influence too. Pakistan would definitely like to play a role as it has major problems with the Pakistani Taliban and is under a lot of pressure from America to go into North Waziristan. The reason why the Army is hesitant is because we've already got a lot on our plate. So any sensible person would like to do it in stages - you cannot be over-stretched.
You held the key position of Foreign Minister in the Musharraf/Shaukat Aziz government? How would you compare your tenure with that of the current government on the foreign relations front?
Deeds speak louder than words. We were accused of accepting a lot of American influence. There were a lot of rumors about our supporting the U.S. resolution for the attack on Iraq and we opposed it. We did not send our troops. We did not vote against Iran in Vienna on the Iranian nuclear issue, India did. We went ahead with the gas pipeline deal. I think they are trying to follow what we did but as they say in Urdu 'naqal kay liye bhi aqal chahiye.' I wish them the best of luck, whether it is India, Iran, Afghanistan or America - I wish them all the best.
You must be in touch with the former president. What do you talk about?
I am in touch with him and when I am in London I meet him. What I say to him politically is a different matter. That is political advice. I'm not one of those who would shed him because he is out of power. A lot of good work was done during his time - concerning women, minorities, the media, local bodies. The mistakes that were made are also clear. For example, the Chief Justice issue was mishandled and we had to bear a big price; the country did as well.
Would it be wise for Pervez Musharraf to return to Pakistan and make a bid for power?
I have advised him not to come. He asked me and I told him not to but in politics there is no last word. People believed Nawaz Sharif would never come back but he did. So I told him to wait and see what the people want - that is most important and there's no need to rush.
Can you enumerate Pervez Musharraf's positives and negatives?
He has the capacity to take difficult decisions, for example over Kashmir. He showed a lot of courage in inviting Vajpayee. Both of them were attacked by certain sections in their countries. He showed a lot of leadership as a man of Kargil. His views about women and minorities were in line with Quaid-e-Azam's views. Inspite of the 18th Amendment they have been unable to change that and I'm glad. 
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