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The major players in South Asia mostly focus on building hard power capabilities. But they have a soft-power potential as well that they could sell more effectively. Soft power theorists argue that in a globalized world the powers of persuasion are as important as, if not more important than, the persuasiveness of power. The former includes a country's cultural appeal, international marketability, mass media projection and civilizational prestige. Combined, these different aspects of soft power can win hearts and minds and thus facilitate the attainment of national interests.
The latter includes the more traditional combination of military assets, intelligence resources, raw economic muscle, administrative capacity and political will. These old-fashioned manifestations of hard power are, it is proclaimed, no longer as relevant as soft power. Satellite television channels can trump ballistic missiles. The global appeal of curry in a hurry beats hard power projection through aircraft carriers and Harriers.
One thing that soft power is a testament to is the ability of the human race to delude itself. It is remarkable that a hypothesis as intellectually bogus and empirically fragile should be projected as a legitimate new way of looking at old problems. The soft power world view is substantially invalidated by historical experience, events and trends of the contemporary era (1990-present) and future possibilities arising from historical experience and the dynamics of contemporary issues. Historically, a country's soft power is a consequence of it having, or having had at some time in the past, great amount of hard power. The global penetration of the English language, for instance, is part of the British imperial legacy, which includes the birth and rise of the United States of America, and the resultant dynamism of the North Atlantic economy. The popular appeal of Marxism-Leninism and the proliferation of fashionably leftist third world bourgeoisie was a direct effect of the Soviet Union's astonishing transition from the feudal age to the space age in less than 40 years (1922-1957). Before the Second World War various race theories were propagated and accepted as legitimate hypotheses. The relatively benign civilizing mission of the British in India subscribed to the same pseudoscientific social Darwinism that animated the genocidal fury of Nazi Germany, the relentless aggression of Imperial Japan or the crazed greed that killed millions in Belgian controlled Congo. Differences of degree granted, superior technological, military and economic power justified exploitation and oppression. It was America's hard power that won the west from the Native Americans and Mexicans though the American pursuit of living space at the expense of its less powerful neighbors might be romanticized in countless Hollywood westerns. The ease with which the Ottoman Caliphate was disposed of by the Turkish nationalists, much to the chagrin of idealistic Pan-Islamists in British India, demonstrates yet again the illusory nature of soft power and its necessary dependence on hard power. Historically, therefore, power is power. A vast empire that possesses a sound economy, a powerful military, a competent administrative elite and a pragmatic leadership with enough political will to deal effectively with challenges, can also enjoy cultural prestige and charisma. Depending on the duration and success of that empire, its intellectual and cultural legacy may well outlast its physical dominion. This, however, does not alter the terms of causation for the imperial legacy is an effect of hard power control. Other nations and states of more moderate strength and disposition have a proportionately moderate cultural impact and appeal. Thus, Malaysia is admired for its political stability and economic prosperity amidst cultural diversity. South Korea is envied, along with Taiwan, for making a single generation leap to mature industrialization. Some very small states, like Singapore, Monaco or Luxemburg, are greatly admired on account of their wealth. Walls have come down, regional economies unified, the Internet unleashed and the world turned into a global village. Of course, one can't have a village without a village idiot and the behavior of the United States since its triumph over the Soviet Union has demonstrated how infectious idiocy is in the global village. The events and trends of the contemporary era should serve as a powerful corrective to the soft-power-hearts-and-minds approach. Take globalization of communications, which brings people into intense, often unwanted, contact with other cultures, worldviews and tendencies. By doing so, conflict is stimulated and a possibility for greater mutual understanding is opened up. Which way people jump depends on the hard power configuration that prevails at the time. If a dialogue is initiated, its terms are modified by the hard power balance. Just because kung fu movies are popular in the West and McDonald's in the East does not mean that the U.S. and China will agree on military procurement and investment, energy policy or the environment. It is the Chinese accumulation of hard power, particularly in the military and economic spheres - ICBMs, submarines, massive foreign exchange reserves that incidentally help the U.S. finance its over-consumption and trade surpluses - that worries western governments and some of China's neighbors. The 2008 Beijing Olympics was the soft power fruit of hard power seeds carefully nurtured over decades of market socialism. The popularity of American fast food or pop music or political theories does not translate into agreement with its strategic policies. During the Shah's rule in Iran perhaps half a million Iranians were sent to study in the U.S. and many of these American-educated men and women became the spearhead of the 1979 revolution. In Pakistan, democratic governments have traditionally been more hostile to U.S. policies in the region than non-democratic dispensations due to the overwhelming public antipathy towards the American government. With U.S. hard power in decline following a decade of imperial misadventures, flawed domestic policies and strategic overextension, there is little doubt that Washington's ability to influence the global village is also going to decrease. But that doesn't mean that people will stop wearing jeans or listening to rap music or eating at Pizza Hut. Soft power just doesn't matter strategically or diplomatically unless backed by hard power. The only part of the world where the soft power approach seems to have made headway is Europe and more specifically the European Union. This achievement, however, is made possible by the Europe's outsourcing of the rather distasteful hard power issues and problems to the U.S. The present peace of Europe is to a very substantial degree enabled and sustained by the U.S. strategic umbrella. Post-1945, if the U.S. had not aggressively contained the Soviet Union there is little doubt that the whole of continental Europe would have fallen to communism. The beginning of a new decade furnishes an opportunity to reflect on what has been and on what may be. Looking towards the future, soft power rhetoric is set to confront some very hard realities. There are simply too many people on this planet for the majority of them to be sustained at a standard of living comparable to the industrial democracies. Depletion of natural resources is likely to impose harsh limits on economic and population growth. The failure to hammer out a real compromise at the 2009 Copenhagen summit has left everybody more vulnerable to climate change. Large parts of the world, including South Asia, are experiencing administrative breakdown and gross socioeconomic inequities. Other parts of the world are likely to spend the next generation coping with the fallout of U.S. imperial misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq. On an overpopulated, resource-starved, economically imbalanced, and environmentally degraded planet, soft power will be utterly meaningless. Those powers that possess the requisite ruthlessness, military capability, material superiority, effective administration and political will, are likely to prevail. Those powers that are deficient on these and other indices of hard power are likely to perish or be marginalized. The hard power outlook for South Asia is bleak and being lulled into smug complacency by soft-power mantras that will only serve to completely compromise the region's future. 
Ilhan Niaz is the author of ‘The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan, 1947-2008’ and ‘An Inquiry into the Culture of Power of the Subcontinent’ He is currently an Assistant Professor of History at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
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