A Nexus for Instability

India has historical ties with Afghanistan which deepened during the days of cold war when Pakistan joined the US sponsored western alliance and allowed an American base in Peshawar. Kabul's age-old conflict with Pakistan over the Durand Line and its drive to support the Pakhtoonistan movement not only augmented the war of words but also led to the suspension of their diplomatic relations in early 1960s. Pakistan's role in Afghanistan during 1980s and 1990s to train Pashtun-led Mujahideen groups proved to be counter-productive and the anti-India policy of Taliban regime (1996-2001) compelled New Delhi to support the Northern Alliance. The collapse of Taliban regime following the US led attack over Afghanistan in early October 2001 provided new opportunities for India to re-establish its influence in Afghanistan. That is how Indo-Pak conflict over Afghanistan took a new shape as the pro-American Karzai regime, dependent on the support from the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance decided to give extra space to India and welcomed New Delhi's generous economic and technical assistance for the rebuilding and reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Four important factors need to be taken into account while examining the myth and reality of Indo-Afghan nexus and its implications for Pakistan. First, the surge of India's influence over Afghanistan became a source of alarm for Pakistan because of historical reasons. From the creation of Pakistan till the seizure of power by the Taliban in September 1996, Kabul pursued a pro-Indian approach. Afghanistan was the only country to cast a negative vote in the UN General Assembly when Pakistan's case for membership in the United Nations was presented. Although King Zahir Shah was not hostile to Pakistan but he was also not supportive to his eastern neighbor. The unresolved issue of Durand Line, the drive for Pakhtoonistan and resentment in Kabul against Pakistan joining the Western alliance system, formed the basis of hostile feelings in Afghanistan against Pakistani state policies.

Afghanistan was all too willing to seek Indian and Soviet help to exert pressure on Pakistan to the extent that when the Soviet leaders Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Kabul in 1955, they openly expressed their support for the Afghan policy of Pakhtoonistan. India since the beginning was pursuing Kabul to be hard on Pakistan which made things difficult for Pakistan as it was sandwiched between the two hostile neighbors: India and Afghanistan.

Second, the issue of Indian consulates in Afghanistan is also quite relevant while examining the dynamics of Indo-Pak discord on Afghanistan. Islamabad has often argued that Indian consulates bordering Pakistan are involved in sponsoring subversion and terrorism on its soil. Pakistan's Federal Interior Minister and the Foreign Office periodically mention the dubious role of Indian consulates against Pakistan, particularly in the context of recent phase of violence and terrorism in NWFP and Punjab. As far as Baluchistan is concerned, repeatedly, Pakistani authorities have asserted India's involvement in fanning Baloch uprising against the state.

Third, India wants Pakistan to provide transit facilities for trade with Afghanistan. So far Pakistan has resisted the Indian pressure, a fact which cannot be denied. It is not only India which is demanding transit facilities for Afghanistan; Kabul too continues to press Pakistan to allow Indo-Afghan trade via Pakistan. For Islamabad, such requests are not acceptable because of security reasons. Finally, India and Pakistan are also competing for their influence in Central Asia and both are aware that getting a foothold in Central Asia would require a friendly regime in Kabul and peace in Afghanistan.

Other important factors which shape Indo-Afghan relations are: the alarm expressed by Kabul about cross-border infiltration, alleged safe havens of Al Qaida in the tribal areas of Pakistan and the nexus between Pakistani military establishment and extremist religious groups. Both Afghan nationalists and India hold Pakistan responsible for terrorism and instability in the region because of what they call Inter-Service Intelligence's (ISI) rapport with Taliban groups. Terming Taliban as the creators of ISI, both Kabul and New Delhi caution the United States of its strategic cooperation with Islamabad. The attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul was blamed on ISI but was denied by Islamabad.

India's grand designs in Afghanistan could be gauged from the fact that is not only involved in constructing road and provided medical facilities to Afghans, but is also training the Afghan armed forces and providing hundreds of scholarships to Afghan students to study in India. The Hindu and Sikh community in Afghanistan which bore the brunt of Taliban's religious fanaticism began returning after the overthrow of Taliban regime. The popularity of Indian films and songs in Afghanistan also create an Indian constituency in the country.

The deepening of fears about the worsening security situation in Afghanistan is not only shared by the Western powers but also by India, China and Russia. Under the Indian initiative, a meeting of foreign ministers of India, China and Russia was held in Bangalore in October 2009 to discuss the situation. A joint communiqué ‘emphasized the necessity of the international community maintaining its commitment to render assistance to the government and people of Afghanistan in ensuring security and development, and restoring peace and stability and building a democratic, pluralistic and prosperous Afghanistan." There may be far-reaching implications of the Bangalore meeting. First, India, Russia and China no doubt expressed their hostility to Taliban and their resolve not to allow their return to power. Second, in the event of the failure of the US/NATO forces in Afghanistan, there is likelihood that India, Russia and China may intervene in Afghanistan in order to prevent the return of Taliban.

The three powers provide an alternate to the Untied States in Afghanistan. The exclusion of Pakistan and Iran from the Bangalore meeting is interesting because without the support and cooperation of these two neighbors of Afghanistan, neither China, nor Russia or India can achieve their interests in Afghanistan. If Iran joins India, China and Russia for a grand anti-Taliban alliance, pressure on Pakistan may further mount because still the perception that a segment of Pakistani establishment is supportive to Taliban has some truth.

It seems Afghanistan because of its chaotic situation would remain a battleground for India and Pakistan. Yet, despite the Afghan predicament to stop foreign interventions since its inception as a nation-state in 1947, all past interventions proved to be a fiasco for the intervening powers. Pakistan knows that without normalizing its relations with India, there is no way both neighbors can cooperate in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's joining of SAARC should have created opportunities for a regional role for peace and stability in Pakistan but such a possibility failed to materialize. As long as the intelligence of two countries, RAW and ISI are allowed to meddle in Afghanistan, there is no possibility of a consensus between India and Pakistan on peace and stability in that war-torn country.

The people of Afghanistan are quite bitter that their country has not only become a hot spot of foreign forces but is also a proxy war ground for India and Pakistan. Targeting each other's consulates and embassies in Afghanistan is a cause of enormous embarrassment for Kabul. It is high time, India and Pakistan realize that a destabilized Afghanistan would remain a threat to Central, South and West Asia and it is in the interest of the two countries not to deepen their conflict over Afghanistan. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan is in the interest of both India and Pakistan.

Moonis Ahmar is a Visiting DAAD Fellow at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany. He is also Professor of International Relations at the University of Karachi and Director, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution.

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