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The protracted problem of the integration of Nepal's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is far from closed. The problem is political rather than military. The peace deal was conceived so that there would not be a military solution to the decade-long conflict. It had struck two birds with one stone. First, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) would be a civilian political force. Secondly, both the Nepal Army (NA) and the PLA would be kept under the authority of the civilian government, implying that the PLA would no longer be a force under the CPN (Maoist). In the ongoing conflict of words, both principles have been violated.
The comprehensive peace deal on the basis of which the CPN (Maoist) agreed to lay down arms under the supervision of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) states that both the NA and the PLA will refrain from fresh recruitment until a national solution is reached. That mandate was first violated by the NA, and now it is the turn of the PLA to repeat the defiance. When the NA announced its schedule for recruitment for a number of vacancies, the PLA had stated that it would also go ahead with fresh recruitment if the NA programme was not stopped. The prime minister and the defence minister had almost gone on a collision course against the NA and asked it to stay the stated recruitment. But a defiant NA went ahead with the process of recruitment. Later, it was almost paradoxically agreed to by the government. The NA said that it was just filling regular vacancies. This is a superficial argument because all recruitments are made for vacancies. Now the PLA is arguing that it is filling the regular vacancies created by the disqualification of some members of the PLA about 13,000 by UNMIN. This raises a series of fresh political questions. First, what is the status of the nation's army vis-à-vis the civilian government? In the former regime, the army was supposed to be the arm of the monarch. But the Interim Constitution has delegated that authority to the civilian government. If the present government cannot rein in the army, it is its fundamental lapse. Parliament should take political action against the cabinet for this lapse. Secondly, is the PLA still the military wing of the CPN (Maoist) or is it under the authority of the civilian government? It is a coincidence that the defence minister belongs to the CPN (Maoist), but as defence minister, he functions outside the jurisdiction of the party. If another party worker were allotted the defence portfolio, he or she would not be treated differently. The implication is that the PLA is no more the military tool of the CPN (Maoist). It stands on the verge of either being integrated into the army or adjusted somewhere under the government. If it continues to be treated as the military arm of the CPN (Maoist), the mother party cannot claim to have accepted a peaceful transition into the mainstream of a competitive multiparty democratic process. So the party should entrust it to the care of the civilian government. The third point implied in the controversy is that it is making the integration plan impossible. Integration presupposes the sizing of the army the nation needs. Both the NA and the PLA are not the decider of their size. The size of the army can best be decided by the Constituent Assembly (CA) in the new version of the constitution. The NA and the PLA are still juxtaposing themselves as adversaries. They were adversaries during the 10 years of the armed insurgency. But it is no longer so. So there will have to be fresh reorientation for both the NA and the PLA. Whatever mode of integration is adopted, both outfits are supposed to remould themselves accordingly. The present stand taken by the two pre-empts a plausible process of integration. The fourth political point involved in the controversy is the deplorable roles played by the political parties including those that are in the opposition and those that are party to the coalition. The most glaring flaw is that whereas almost all the parties are opposed to outright integration, not a single party has offered a viable alternate plan. They have not only not given a positive indication, but also shown their biases and short-sightedness. While most of the parties were silent on the question of the NA making fresh recruitment, they are vehemently crying themselves hoarse against the newly proposed PLA recruitment. From a critical review, it can be seen that they want to dump the problem on the shoulders of the CPN (Maoist) by adamantly opposing every plausible solution. Now the matter of the NA recruitment has gone to the door of the court. It is hoped that the court will examine every possible pro and con of the problem and provide a workable solution. While everyone should abide by the decision of the court, it is regrettable that a political case has been entrusted to the discretion of the court. The top leaders should shun small differences and think ahead with a vision for the projected future course of the state. They are going to make history. The army does not decide how it will operate in the new system. It is a professional organization with its own aims and methods. But it is not free to make politically influential decisions. Its autonomy must be respected, but it should not have the jurisdiction of bypassing the decision of the civilian government. If the new constitution makes a decision to cut the size of the army, will it have the right to go on filling the present posts claiming that it has the right to fill the vacancies? This claim will be preposterous. Presently, the army is under an embargo not to recruit new cadets until a national solution is found, and it should stay within it. Similarly, the PLA should abide by the embargo. The PLA could not sustain its claim that its strength was 31,000 when UNMIN was verifying their position. The present claim that it will refill 13,000 “vacancies” is, therefore, not valid. It must be accepted that the PLA is no more a live fighting force under the CPN (Maoist), which has abandoned its rebel status and has agreed to dissolve the PLA after a workable solution is found. Its 19,000 personnel have been the responsibility of the state by virtue of the agreement and the verification. It has no right to impose another 13,000 persons on the shoulders of the nation. The embargo should be equally applicable to both the NA and the PLA. UNMIN was a neutral judge. It had stated that the NA recruitment was against the principle of the embargo. It may or will again declare that the PLA recruitment is also a violation of the embargo. The government should have had the power and guts to enforce the embargo on the NA. Failing in that right, it will find it embarrassing to enforce the same embargo on the PLA. That is the unfortunate verdict on the performance of the government. The PLA's integration is a national problem, and all the political parties should sit together to solve it. 
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